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Glossary*
Afs Afghan unit of currency; approximately 50 Afghanis = 1 USD
arbab chosen representative of a village
jerib unit of land measurement; approximately one-fifth of a hectare
khairat voluntary alms
khan landlord
komak assistance
maulawi Islamic theologian
mozarebat a partnership between an investor and a businessman in which one provides
the money and the other provides the work; profit is divided between the
two, while the loss is carried only by the investor
mullah religious leader
mazdur daily labourer
qala a walled, fortress-like compound
qarz credit
qarz-i-hasana credit on good terms, with no interest
qarz-i-khodadad a loan given on the understanding that the debtor will repay when God
provides the opportunity
qawm kinship group, often a tribe or sub-division of a tribe; also used for the
community where one lives
qurut dry cheese
ramazan month of fasting
salam a well-known form of advanced payment where an advance is provided
for a future harvest at an already fixed (low) price
sawab merits gained when doing a good deed, considered as “profit” from God
or “credit” earned with God
ser one ser=7 kilograms
shariq business partner who provided investment on credit
shura group of elders
sudh credit with interest
taifa tribal lineage
zakat obligatory alms
* Transliterations in this glossary, as well as in the text, are spelled according to AREU’s editorial policy
and do not reflect the opinion of the author(s).
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Acronyms
AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
CHA Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
I-ANDS Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy
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It is widely believed that there is a strong
demand for credit in Afghanistan and that
much of this demand is unmet, justifying a
major programme in microcredit provision.
But there is very little understanding of the
extent and the workings of informal credit
systems, particularly outside opium poppy
growing areas. Is there such an absence of
credit available to poor rural households as
is assumed? Do microfinance and informal
credit respond to the same needs? Is informal
credit simply the same thing as formal credit,
except that it takes place outside formal
institutions? And if there is more informal
credit available than is believed, what does
this mean for the development and role of
formal credit systems?
These key questions informed a detailed
anthropological study of informal credit
practices in three contrasting villages in
Herat, Ghor and Kapisa. Drawing from a
detailed presentation of eight households
case studies, and amplified with addition
case material, a number of key conclusions
can be drawn from the findings.
First, informal credit practices are widespread
with most households both giving and taking
credit, having multiple outstanding debts
simultaneously and a variety of different
households with whom they exchange credit.
Second, there is great diversity in informal
credit practices, the meanings of which have
to be understood according to social context.
A large proportion of these credit transactions
are on a no-interest basis. Third, informal
credit is almost exclusively used for either
consumption smoothing or marriage with very
little being deployed for investment in
enterprises. Fourth, the reasons for entering
into informal credit relations are diverse but
include investment in social networks for
informal security, for providing assistance as
Executive Summary
well as maintaining or consolidating patron
client relations. Fifth, the majority of
households are able to access credit and have
confidence that they will be able to do so.
Sixth, repayment practices are usually highly
flexible and negotiable. Seventh, for many
of the households informal credit has positive
outcomes in achieving immediate welfare
goals. This however is not universal and the
dynamics and characteristics of informal
credit are changing over time.
The methods used in this study have
highlighted the complexity of informal credit
and question the application of models of
formal credit to informal credit. Notions of
debt, interest rates and contractual periods,
for example carry very different meanings
from those that formal credit assume.
Informal credit is not just formal credit
working in an informal institutional setting.
Its practices, assumptions and objectives are
very different and these cannot easily be
generalised about.
The fact that informal credit is mostly used
for consumption needs highlights a key
contrast with microcredit, which is not
designed to address such needs, even though
in reality it might be used for such purposes.
Given this critical role for informal credit, it
is difficult to see how arguments that
microcredit will increase incomes and savings
of the poor can be sustained.  Informal credit
systems are highly unlikely to disappear, not
least for the negotiable flexibility that they
offer. But nor is formal credit likely to exist
independent of informal credit and there is
comparative evidence that microcredit can
become parasitic on informal credit practices.
Much greater attention is needed to how
microcredit works in practice, rather than
just simply reporting the number of loans
disbursed.
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1. Introduction
A year ago Gulab Khan and Shafiqa
(CS44-K),2 together with their four daughters,
returned from Iran to their village in lower
Kapisa. Gulab Khan, who is in his 60s and
with a much younger wife, worked as a driver
for some time after his return but he has
been jobless now for a few months. During
this period he has taken several loans, all
1 Hanifi, S.M, 2004. “Impoverishing a colonial frontier: Cash, credit and debt in nineteenth-century
Afghanistan.” Iranian Studies, 37(2):199.
2 Each household case study presented in this report is tagged with a code refering to household number
and location. Thus CS1-G is case study number one located in Ghor. All households interviewed are
presented with details of their asset portfolio in a matrix in Appendix 1 and follow the same codes.
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“If money is a language, there have been many tongues spoken in Afghanistan.”1
interest free, from relatives — mainly from
his mother’s side or his wife’s family. Although
his known debts have now risen to 14,000
Afs (US$280 ), he recently decided to divide
the compound where he is living with his
brother and his family into two, build a wall
and a new house. Halfway through Ramazan
with only three days of flour left to eat, the
family asked Shafiqa’s maternal cousin for
another loan of 2,000 Afs (US$40). It is unclear
if they had actually received it.
When Safiqa was asked where her family
seeks credit, she said: “We get credit from
the one who knows us, who has good manners,
who does not come every day to our house
asking for their money even though we do
not have money. We go to those who do not
fight with us.” According to Shafiqa, these
people are not found much in the village
anymore. Her household often takes credit
from her relatives who live outside the village:
“We go to cousins, relatives and friends; not
our paternal cousins because they have no
money, their life is the same as ours. We go
to those with a good life, who have a good
economy and good manners.” When Gulab
Khan was asked how he plans to repay these
debts after being unemployed for a few
months, he replied: ”When I find the money,
I will repay.”
This story is quite common in the Kapisa
village among households considered in the
middle wealth group. This illustrates a
confidence in finding informal credit, in
finding the money to repay it and illustrates
a reliance in the functioning of informal
credit systems. As will be shown in this report,
many households from the three village case
studies (in Herat, Kapisa and Ghor) knew
”how to find money.”
The case of Gulab Khan and Shafiqa (CS44-
K) also reinforces the notion that there is a
high level of demand for credit in rural
Afghanistan, fuelled in part by the perceptions
of the role that opium poppy fulfils in
providing informal credit. But while this case
study is evidence of credit demand, it is also
evidence of informal credit supply — a
confidence in finding the money, finding it
in this case on an interest free basis, and
finding it in the case study villages where
CS44-K: Debt portfolio
Credit types: interest-free loans from relatives
Repayment: Qarz-i-khodadad-like loans, paid
“when God provides the opportunity.”
Amount – credit source - credit use:
2,000 Afs* – maternal cousin - for building
house/food
5,000 – maternal cousin - food
1,000 Afs - sister, wife - food
3,000 Afs – civil servant Kapisa/friend – food
3,000 Afs - nephew (wife’s sister’s son) - food
(*unclear if amount was received)
opium poppy was absent. This observation
sits somewhat awkwardly with the
assumptions of the Microfinance Investment
Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA),
which estimates that a potential two million
households are in need of credit and that:
In the almost total absence of functioning
banks or sustainable microfinance
institutions, it was clear that substantial
donor investment would be needed to
build a strong and diverse financial
services sector that would be responsive
to the needs of poor Afghans.3
The aim to provide access to financial services
to 800,000 households by the end of 2010 —
a key rural development benchmark identified
under the Afghanistan Compact and I-ANDS
— clearly responds to MISFA’s perception of
the unavailability of credit. Such perception
is partly driven by assumptions about the
effects of the formal banking systems’
collapse and, as noted above, the role of
opium poppy.
However, there appears to be very little
evidence and understanding of the extent of
availability and workings of informal credit
systems, particularly outside the areas where
opium poppy is grown. Is there such an
absence of credit available to poor rural
households as MISFA, for example, and others
assume? Moreover if we look at informal
credit through the lens of formal financial
systems where money exchange is treated
simply as a commodity exchange, does this
not rather ignore the context of social
relations in which most Afghan’s lead their
lives and the meaning and role that informal
credit plays within these relations? Can it be
assumed that informal credit is basically the
same thing as formal credit — except that it
just happens to take place outside formal
institutions? And if there is more informal
credit available as the above case study hints
at, what implications might this have for the
development and role of formal credit
systems?
These are among the issues that the three
village case studies on informal credit intend
to address. Evidence emerging from these
studies challenges many of the assumptions
about the existence and role of informal
credit and questions the extent to which
formal credit will be able to fulfil the
significant role that informal credit provides,
both for the poor and rich alike.
Section 2 of this report briefly describes the
research methods and context in which this
study was undertaken. Section 3 presents
eight case studies that illustrate many of the
dimensions of informal credit practices
accessed and used by poor, middle ranking
and rich households. These case studies are
then used in Section 4, along with data from
a wider set of case studies, to explore key
issues related to the pervasiveness of informal
credit, its diversity, reasons for giving and
taking credit, questions of access, repayment
practices and outcomes, and how credit
practices are susceptible to change. Section
5 uses these issues to develop a set of critical
arguments addressing misunderstandings and
preconceptions about informal credit:
identifying characteristics of informal credit
including its purpose and the timeless nature
of its contractual aspects; questioning such
concepts as interest rates and default; and
considering the dimensions of a moral
economy and a context of insecurity that
might drive informal credit practices. Section
6 concludes by exploring the implications of
these findings for the development of formal
microcredit systems in Afghanistan.  
3 MISFA website: http://www.misfa.org/about/htm
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2. Context
2.1. Methodology
This study aims to build understanding of the
role that informal credit plays in rural
livelihoods. It does not intend to formally
document the quantitative significance of
credit or debt but more to address questions
of access, use and consequences of taking
credit. It is based on qualitative rather than
quantitative methods, with information
collected from an open-ended checklist rather
than a closed-ended questionnaire. The ques-
tions that were asked and the enquiry pursued
depended greatly on the interviewees, the
composition of their livelihoods and the
dynamics of the discussion. The ongoing
process of field analysis and insights gained
in previous interviews were fed back into
subsequent interviews so that new and
emerging issues could be addressed. This
report is based on three village case studies
conducted in Herat, Kapisa and Ghor provinces
and a pilot study conducted in Balkh
province.4 In each village, an average of 34
in-depth interviews were conducted with
both men and women from different wealth
groups. Details on asset portfolios of the
interviewed respondents and their households
are listed in Appendix 1, along with their
designated codes, which are used as
references throughout the paper.    
The term “credit practice” refers to all
exchanges where one borrows or lends money
or commodities to another. The term
“interest” is used solely for credit where a
profit is made through a pre-determined
percentage mark-up on the loan that increases
the longer repayment is not made. “Credit
with profit” is a term used for the other types
of credit where costs are paid for borrowing
or where a profit is made by the borrower.
“Cost-free credit” is when the lender charges
no marked up value, the credit is free of charge.
Village and respondent selection
To establish whether credit practices differed,
based on the extent of market penetration,
three villages were selected to capture
differing economies. The Ghor village, with
seasonal grain deficits, was selected for its
subsistence-based economy. Although men
did work outside the community, it was often
within the district, and the majority of
households within the village were primarily
dependent on agricultural production and
casual labour in the village. The village in
Kapisa was selected initially on the assumption
that it produced cotton for the market. When
fieldwork began, however, it became clear
that agricultural production was for
subsistence farming and that due to seasonal
grain deficits daily labour outside the village
was vital for a household’s economy. The
Herat village, the last village studied, was a
wealthy village specifically selected for its
market-based economy, based on the income
generating activities of carpet weaving and
silk production, and the presence of shops
and service providers in the village.
In each study location the research team was
facilitated by a development organisation
already working in the area. The Coordination
of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA) assisted in
Herat, UN Habitat in Kapisa and Oxfam in
Ghor. In consultation with these partners, a
village was selected in each province based
on two criteria: villages needed to be average
in size and representative of village economies
within their district. For the selection of
respondents within the villages, quota
sampling was used in order to distribute the
selection of households across different socio-
economic status categories. The criteria used
to differentiate these categories included
household access to land and income sources.
Researchers monitored the number of
4 To protect respondents’ privacy, the actual names of the villages studied and respondents interviewed
are not used in this report.
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households in each socio-economic category
interviewed each day, aiming for equal
representation in the low-, middle- and high-
income groups. The interview teams also
targeted specific respondents including female
headed households, working women,
households with mortgages, newcomers,
returnees and educated people. This was not
a fixed list, but depended on the village
composition.
Wealth categorisation
It was important for the study to ensure that
social assets, as well as the dynamics of
household livelihood trajectories, were taken
into account in grouping the respondents in
the three wealth categories: wealthy, middle-
ranking and poor. A more detailed and refined
categorisation of respondents was used in
the analysis phase. Such grouping was
continually reassessed throughout the study
based as new insights emerged.
After analysing each family’s economic status
in detail — access to land and its contribution
to food (in)security, household size and
additional income sources, the depth and
breadth of social relations, household
trajectory over time and their credit practices
— a final wealth grouping specific to each
studied village was developed. In addition,
there were specific situations included as an
indicator of a household’s wealth status, for
example, how families married off their sons,
or how they were able to finance the building
of a house, as well as their access to credit.
Although the categorisation facilitates analysis
and the presentation of findings, it is not an
absolute classification; with some households
it was unclear in which wealth group they
were best placed. For example the couple in
Kapisa presented in the Introduction (CS44-
K), were landless, with no sons, no secure
income sources and mounting debts but were
building a house. Their income sources suggest
that they should be classified as poor, however
the fact they can still access credit and build
a house suggests that they may also belong
to the middle ranking wealth group.
Categorisation, therefore, is used in this
report to place household situations within
a specific time; it is not, by any means, a
categorical judgement about their position
in life.
2.2 Research settings
The socio-economic context of the households
and the region has proven to be essential in
understanding informal credit practices. An
attempt is made to draw a concise picture
of the villages, the regional economy and
their dynamics over time. However, before
providing village-specific descriptions, it is
important to identify some of the change
processes that have taken place.
In addition to the differing experiences of
conflict and drought over the last three
decades or so, all the villages have also
experienced economic changes. While conflict
and drought have driven processes of de-
capitalisation for many households, processes
of economic change have provided new or
expanded income-generating opportunities,
which can contribute to improved wellbeing.
The way in which these two countervailing
forces have worked out in practice for
households, affecting household trajectories
and the role of and access to credit, is case
specific.
The Ghor village5
The Ghor village in Lal wa Sarjangal district,
where both Hazaras and Sayyed live, has
periodically experienced armed conflict over
the last three decades. In 1997–1998, a
Taliban-imposed blockade of the Hazarajat
region led to acute food insecurity,6 followed
by a drought that lasted until 2002. All
vi4
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5 For more details, see Klijn, 2007. Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan, Case Study 3: Ghor. Kabul: Afghanistan
Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU).
6 Semple, 1998. Strategies for Support of Sustainable Rural Livelihoods for the Central Highlands of Afganistan, Draft.
Islamabad: Pattan Development Organisation.
7 One jerib=approximately one-fifth of a hectare.
households are currently still recovering from
the effects of these on asset holdings.
The Ghor village has a limited cash economy
and exchange is largely on a barter basis.
The village is relatively isolated and has,
compared to the other two study villages,
limited external economic linkages.
Agricultural production is the main income
source (income in kind), though the majority
of households and perhaps the village in
general—experience grain deficit annually.
Livestock was previously the main
complement to grain production but due to
the Taliban blockade and the following four
years of drought, livestock holdings collapsed
and are still in the process of recovering.
Casual labour has always played an important
role in gaining access to food security and
has now replaced the role of livestock as a
main source of supplementary income. Work
can be found either in daily labour or contract
labour. For the landless, contract work, where
a labourer is hired for a pre-arranged period
and wage, has always been the main if not
the only source of income. This type of
contract offers more than the typical work
agreement in that the landlord hiring a
contract labourer is obliged and expected
“to take care” of the labourer and his family.
One respondent (CS65-G) and his family lived
in the house of his “benefactor”/landlord as
a joint household.
Crop production in the Ghor village is mainly
rain-fed wheat and barley. On the valley floor
there are small plots of irrigated land, which
belong to the wealthier households. Cash
crops, such as potato and poplar, are grown
as well as fodder. An important activity in
the village is the collection of fuel (bushes)
and fodder in the mountains. Winters last
four to five months and sufficient food, fuel
and fodder are required for a household’s
survival over this period. The majority of
households rely on credit to achieve food
security. Besides agriculture, livestock and
casual labour, handicrafts are made and sold
mainly within the village and occasionally to
shopkeepers in the district market place.
Wealthy households relatively maintain large
land (more than ten jeribs of rain-fed land7)
and livestock holdings (more than 15 sheep).
In general, they experience grain surplus
through which they can hire contract labourers
to work on the land. Although they work on
a contract basis, these labourers often live
on advances taken for labour provided in the
future, which in some cases result in situations
of bonded labour. There was often a relation
of interdependency between big landowners
and landless labourers. The middle-ranking
households were all small landowners
(between one and ten jeribs of rain-fed land),
working on their own land. These households
experience grain deficits on a regular basis
and achieve food security through casual
labour in the village and occasionally daily
labour outside the village. Four wealthy
villagers have set up shops in the bazaar in
the district centre.
The regional economy of the Lal wa Sarjangal
has been characterised over the last three
to four decades by the establishment of
centralised bazaars, improved infrastructure,
and the establishment of education and health
facilities. The district centre, half an hour
by car, has become a small centre of
commerce as well as a source of job
opportunities. The current (re)construction
of roads and schools, as well as opium poppy
cultivation in the main valley, have also
increased daily labour possibilities. However,
those households accessing daily labour are
all from the middle-ranking wealth group.
Poor households do not engage in daily labour
which can be explained through the claims
they have on their labour through advances
as well as the loyalty in exchange for
patronage.
5
Finding the Money: Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan
The Kapisa village8
At the time the study was conducted, the
research team encountered Pashtuns who
spoke Dari in the Kapisa village, located in
the Mohammed Raqi district. The team also
observed how the village was still dealing with
setbacks from major events in the country’s
history: armed conflict for nearly a decade
during the Soviet war, and the subsequent
drought that lasted from 1998 to 2002. These
events have led to repeated cycles of
depopulation and resettlement, with many
households fleeing to Pakistan or Iran.
The economy of the Kapisa village is largely
cash-based. Agricultural production is its
main economic activity, even though all
households studied experience grain deficit
and require additional income sources to
achieve food security. Families end up relying
on daily wage labour outside the village
(usually in Kabul, a two-hour trip by car) to
augment their incomes. Other income-
generating activities they participate in
include shopkeeping, carpentry, shoemaking
and flour milling. In addition, one doctor, a
teacher and a mullah were working in the
village or in a nearby community. 
The village lands are irrigated for the
cultivation of wheat, maize and, at times,
cotton. The majority of households own small
plots of land (up to six jeribs), which in
general are too small a land area to provide
grain self-sufficiency. The landless households
are not necessarily the poorest; they can rely
on daily wage labour or a more regular income
through business or monthly salaried labour
in the district centre. Many households have
relatives living outside the village in the
Shomali plain or in Kabul who, especially in
the case of poor households, provide ongoing
assistance, often in the form of credit.
The local economy had undergone major
changes over a course of four decades. In
the early 1970s, land relations were still
based on a patron-client relationship, with
a small number of landlords whose land was
8 For more details see Klijn, 2006. Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan, Case Study 2: Kapisa. Kabul: AREU.
Most villagers have multiple debts owed simultaneously, including to shopkeepers in the bazaar, who are an important
source of informal credit.
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cultivated by a large number of sharecroppers.
Increased access to job opportunities in the
region (Shomali plain in Parwan province and
Kapisa) and abroad, monetization of the local
economy, and changing patterns of land
ownership has transformed the socio-
economic relations within the village. The
majority of the households interviewed have
been able to purchase land 30 to 40 years
ago.
The Herat village9
The Herat village, located in the Zinda Jan
district (half an hour by car from Herat city),
experienced major economic setbacks due
to armed conflict in the 1980s and the recent
drought. As a result many households had
moved to Iran, some even twice. The Herat
village, where the inhabitants are said to be
Turks, is relatively urbanised based on the
comparatively extensive labour market, the
number and diversity of shops, small
businesses, facilities and services available
to residents (health clinics and secondary
education), and reliance on a cash economy.
Income-generating activities in the village
are agricultural and silk productions, livestock
breeding, carpet weaving and wholesale,
shopkeeping, carpentry, tailoring, handicrafts
and daily wage labour. Women from poor
households often work for other households
cleaning, washing clothes and baking bread.
Labour migration to Iran is a common practice
to obtain additional income or savings. Women
in all wealth groups were actively engaged
in income-generating activities: weaving
carpets, making and selling handicrafts,
producing raw silk and working as teachers.
Households in all wealth groups sent members
to work in Iran to avail of its higher daily
labour wages compared to Herat and the
village. This income source provided
opportunities to save or to take credit, with
the latter repaid with the money earned in
Iran. Iran has also influenced the villagers in
another way; there appears to be a trend of
households splitting up into nuclear families,
a common practice in Iran, according to
respondents. As a result, some villagers have
bought small plots of land on which to
construct new family houses.
Wealth is mainly defined by access to multiple
productive assets including shops, cars or
partnerships in business ventures (mozarebat).
In contrast, poverty was often related to
household composition and its effect on
access to income sources. For example, a
large household with only one adult male to
rely on for income has limited resources.
Because he needs to support the family on
a daily basis, the male breadwinner is unable
to explore work elsewhere and is restricted
to the highly seasonal daily labour available
within the village.
As with Kapisa, socio-economic relations in
the Herat village have changed over the last
four to five decades. The big landlords of the
past all sold their land. More recently, the
Herat village seemed to have benefited from
a changing economic environment,
particularly from increased job opportunities
credited to its proximity to Herat city and
Iran.
Village contrasts
The main trend identified in all three locations
over the last three to four decades is an
apparent increase in labour opportunities.
This occurred earlier in this period and is
observed to be more widespread in the Herat
village than in the other two villages. The
Ghor village, in particular, has only recently
experienced a significant economic change.
Increased job opportunities have had a major
impact on household livelihood strategies in
Herat and Kapisa based on the following
effects:
9 For more details see Klijn, 2006. Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan, Case Study 1: Herat. Kabul: AREU.
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• Reduced reliance on agricultural
product ion as  more income
opportunities became available;
• Reduced seasonal food shortages; and
• Shifts in credit sources from landlords
or wealthier households in the village
to extended family networks.
In the Kapisa village, household access to
more job opportunities, including labour
migration to Iran which started in the 1970s,
resulted in families being able to buy small
plots of land.10 Subsequently, landholdings
have become smaller, often not enough to
provide a household with sufficient
agricultural produce.
In the Herat village, there are many other
job or business opportunities within the
community that land has lost its importance.
In a recent election to choose a new arbab
(chosen representative of a village), all male
residents, both landless and landowners,
participated when traditionally this was a
privilege only land holders enjoyed.
These developments were not documented
in the Ghor village. Even though the regional
economy has improved, households are still
very much recovering from the Taliban
blockade and the four-year drought.  
Nevertheless, households in all three study
sites and in each wealth group still deal with
a high-risk environment. Both seasonal and
long-term lean periods still occur, as do
crises. Through these expected and
unexpected challenges, credit has always
played a role in enabling families to get by.
But just as socio-economic conditions shift,
so do credit practices, as discussed in more
detail in Section 4.5.
10 Land was available for sale after large landowners sold small plots of land. The reason behind this sale remains unclear.
Respondents alluded to either the landowner being a big spender, or that the loss was Allah’s will.
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3. Household Case Studies
This section briefly presents details on eight
household case studies selected to illustrate
some of the different dimensions of debt and
credit found in the study sites. Narrative
accounts of each of the Selected eight case
studies are presented in Sections 3.2–3.4.
Table 1 summarises some key features of
these households to highlight patterns of
similarities and differences.
3.1 Key features
The debt portfolios of the select households
have a number of features worth drawing
attention to. Their meaning in a wider context
is presented in Section 4.
1. All households have multiple debts with
varying maturity: some are short-term
seasonal debts, others have been in
existence for a number of years. Some
households are giving and receiving
credit; Abdul Fatah’s family (CS22-H) is
one example.
2. Debts taken are either in terms of cash
or food and relate either to the needs
for consumption or marriage. In the Ghor
case studies (CS84-G, CS76-G and CS63-
G), the majority of debts, particularly
of the two lower ranking households are
either paid in grain or labour. Credit for
business or income generating activities
was only found in Herat and is
exemplified by Akbar Khan (CS12-H) who
reported taking business credit to set up
his shop and give loans to carpet weavers.
3. A noticeable number of loans are
obtained either from relatives or even
neighbours (see CS58-K, CS23-H and CS63-
K) and interest free loans are provided
by members of all wealth groups. While
many of the debts represent loans that
need to be repaid, a number of
households also receive direct assistance
of food as gifts (see CS58-K, CS25-H and
CS12-H). In Ghor, however, more of the
credit given and taken between
households within the village, including
between relatives, have costs attached
to them. As the case studies show (see
Section 3.2 – 3.4) and as will be explored
in more detail in Sections 4 and 5, costs
do not necessarily imply interest. In most
cases, households express a confidence
in being able to repay at some stage,
illustrating the flexibility in contract
periods of existing debt.
4. For households with existing debts and
again cutting across the wealth groups,
there is a confidence that additional
credit can usually be accessed from one
source or another (see CS84-K and CS25-
H). CS63-G for example, had no difficulty
in raising a substantial sum for his son’s
marriage.
5. For households in the Ghor village, which
has more of a barter economy and
perhaps greater inequalities in land
access but which appears to be a labour
deficit economy, debts could be worked
off with labour in kind (CS84-G and CS76-
G). For households without land in Kapisa
and Herat, income could be earned from
labour for cash.
6. Households with land (middle and higher
ranking households) showed willingness
to mortgage it, particularly in relation
to raising money for a bride price. There
is clearly a strategic element in this as
illustrated by Reza’s (CS76 –G) decision
to re-mortgage his land against rising
values to pay off an earlier mortgage.
7. The strategic value of daughters in terms
of overall debt management is
systematically acknowledged; expected
bride prices are part of debt repayment
strategies and enter into “calculations”
of credit worthiness. This is evident in
both poor households, such as Parween’s
(CS8-K), and among wealthier households
such as Zainab’s (CS33-G).
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Case Household profile Income Debts/ Credit Means of
study sources Credit form provider repayment
Poor
Grain
Large Contract
Own house landowner labour
CS84–G
No land or livestock Contract
Grain Shopkeeper
Contract
Husband and wife with labour labour
3 young daughters Labour, 2 House Contract
years ago builder labour
Multiple cash Wife’s sister,
CashLoans neighbours
 Dung cakes, Sister Assistance,
CS58–K wood plus labour
Flour Shopkeeper Cash
Cash Builder Cash
Food
Wealthy Assistancehouseholds
CS25–H Cash Shopkeeper Cash from
Cash Neighbours khairat
Middle-ranking
Land mortgage Wealthy Re-mortgage
for bride price household with rise in
land value
CS76-G Cash–
Food In-laws possible
labour
Food Shopkeeper Labour
Daily labour Cash Village Mortgage
CS40-K Land, family of 12 and sharecrop Mortgage Village ?
Food Shopkeeper Cash
Food Shopkeeper Cash
Cash credit
Relatives,
CashCS23-H neighbours
Food credit
Relatives,
Foodneighbours
Wealthy
Food Shopkeepers
Barter and
cash
Cash for bride
Relatives Cash
CS63-G
price
Livestock for
Relatives Livestockbride price
Remaining In-laws ?bride price
Material credit Carpet Carpetsweavers
CS8-H Cash credit Poor Cash/kind
Cash and food 
Poor Assistanceassistance
Table 1. A profile of eight household case studies and their informal credit history
G=Ghor; K=Kapisa; H=Herat; ?=no data
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No land
arbab
Land, livestock,
motorbike
Extended household;
Land and livestock
Husband, second wife
3 small children
Land and livestock
Death of first wife,
father and brother
Own house
No land or livestock
Old man, young wife
4 young daughters
No land, one cow
Husband disabled
3 daughters and 3 sons
Occasional
casual labour;
Wife,
domestic
Wife,
domestic;
Son, casual
Land
Casual
labour
Land and
livestock
Shopkeeper
and business
Teaching
Sharecrop
8. Shocks that are specific to households
such as deaths (in the case of Reza -
CS76-G), accidents (in the case of Baser
Ahmad - CS25-H) and even in the case
of Akbar Khan (CS17-H) whose father lost
all his land, can clearly cause specific
hardships and a drawing down of credit
relations, which the case of Baser Ahmad
(CS25-H) illustrates best. But as Reza’s
case (CS76-G) shows, it is possible to
recover from these downturns. 
The following three sections describe eight
household case studies selected from the
three locations, focusing on the debt
portfolios of poor, middle ranking and rich
households, the type of credit households
engage in (a detailed list of credit types is
presented in the Annex section), and their
means of repayment. These wealth
categories, it should be noted, are relative
to each location and are not absolute.
3.2 Case studies from poor
households
CS84-Ghor: Living on advances
Safar and his wife live in their own house in
the Ghor village together with their three
young daughters. They own no land or
animals. Safar works as a contract labourer
in houses and on the land of families in the
village, but he mainly works for Haji Khaliq
Dad, harvesting on his land or working in and
around his house. Safar always receives his
salary in wheat. This year he received 210
kg wheat for working on the land and 70 kg
wheat for his work in Haji Khaliq Dad’s house.
Safar’s household, however, is often in need
of food before even starting work. He
therefore asks for advances on future work
and in-kind loans, which he repays with work.
In essence, the whole working season from
spring to autumn Safar has been working to
repay outstanding loans or services he used
the previous year. Last spring the household
had no more food. They borrowed 140 kg of
wheat from their wealthy neighbours with
the understanding they would repay it in
labour. Now Safar is working on his
neighbour’s land to repay the wheat borrowed
last spring. But this year Safar also worked
on the land of the builder who worked on his
house two years ago. He was never able to
pay his wages, after which they agreed Safar
would work on his land to pay them.
Sometimes Safar buys some products on credit
from shopkeepers in the bazaar that are from
this village, which he then often repays by
working on their land or cleaning snow for
them during the winter.
CS58-Kapisa: Credit and assistance
Parween (30) and her elderly husband live in
the Kapisa village together with their four
daughters, the oldest being 14 years old.
They have no land or livestock but they own
the house they live in. Parween’s husband
used to be a driver in Kabul but now he is
CS84-G: Debt portfolio
Credit types: advances, in-kind loan with profit
and delayed payment of goods and wages
Repayment: all through labour
Amount – credit source - credit use:
? advance – landlord - food
? – shopkeeper - food
140 kg wheat - neighbours - food
? – builder – delayed wage payment
(? = unknown amount)
CS58-K: Debt portfolio
Credit types: cost-free loans and delayed
payment of goods and wages
Repayment: possible bride price(s)
Amount – credit source - credit use:
Bag of flour – shopkeeper (friend) - food
21 kg wheat – sister - food
? Cash – neighbours/ villagers - food
1,000 Afs – sister - food
1,000 Afs – maternal nephew – food
1,000 Afs – builder – delayed wage payment
2,000 Afs – builder – delayed wage payment
(? = unknown amount)
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old and has difficulty finding a job at all.
When he does not find work he takes credit;
when he does find work he uses his wage to
repay their debts. However, he does not find
work often so the debts are accumulating
and they are receiving more and more
assistance on a gift basis rather than credit
basis.
The family has just returned from Iran one
and half years ago. In Iran her husband was
a daily labourer, from the money earned they
saved 40,000 Afs (US$800) and brought it
back with them to rebuild their house.
However it was not enough. The wages of
the two builders were never paid and are
still outstanding debts. They started borrowing
cash loans as qarz-i-hasana (credit free of
charge) from Parween’s sister, sister in-law,
and from their neighbours and other villagers.
These loans have not been repaid yet.
Parween explains how some of their creditors
from the village come to their door asking
for their money back. “They fight with my
husband saying they want their money back.”
Recently they receive more in-kind loans and
assistance mainly from their relatives. For
the winter her sister has given her dung cakes
and wood to cook on. She occasionally gives
bread too. Parween helps her brother and
his wife on their land in the village and
receives some wheat or maize from them.
During the interview Parween’s husband had
gone to the bazaar to borrow a bag of flour
from a shopkeeper who is an old childhood
friend. Asked how they will repay their debts,
Parween replies: “I have young daughters, if
some good people come to my house for my
daughters I will give my daughters. We will
get 40,000 or 50,000 Afs as bride price. When
I receive the money I will first repay the
debts.” Later she adds: “If someone comes
and asks my husband or myself to work for
them, we will do so. “We are in need; we
have nothing.”
CS25-Herat: Downfall of a family
Baser Ahmad and Kobra in the Herat village
have six children: three daughters and three
CS25-H: Debt portfolio
Credit types: cost-free loan, and delayed
payment of goods. Also provide in-kind credit
Repayment: after receiving khairat (alms)
Amount – credit source - credit use:
3,000 Afs – neighbour – food
3,000 Afs – shopkeeper – food
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Labour is often used to repay outstanding debts, including borrowing  for food consumption.
sons. Baser Ahmad was a sole income provider
working as a sharecropper when he stepped
on a mine during the war and lost both his
legs. Before the accident they had a “good
life,” with a network of relations with whom
they exchanged credit. After the accident,
he fell back on them for support. Baser Ahmad
narrates: “When I became disabled I had
good credit relations for one or two months,
but then these relations slowly ended because
of my physical situation. Now I have no credit
relations.”
Baser Ahmad has brothers who used to live
in the village but they have all moved out to
other villages and started a new life there.
They do not support him. He adds: “When
you have physical power everybody is your
brother, when you are disabled brotherhood
means nothing.” Kobra’s family, who lives in
Iran, only supports them by letting her family
stay in their house while they are away.
The first two years after the accident, they
lived on their savings. When that was gone,
Kobra started cleaning other people’s houses,
washing clothes and baking bread. Their 12-
year old son also earns some extra income
by collecting fuel for other households. But
together, Kobra and her son earn little, and
they often still have to request credit or
assistance from other families. They also
depend on zakat (in Islam obligatory alms)
and khairat (voluntary alms) from wealthier
households.
Baser Ahmad states: “Some people support
us with khairat. If they did not assist me, my
life would be worse. People help me with
cash or wheat. It is komak (assistance) not
qarz (credit) because I cannot pay it back.
But if we need wheat urgently we borrow it
from some people. Then during harvest time
people give us khairat and we repay our debt.
We can never repay it outside harvest time.”
Kobra explains how they sometimes do take
credit: “Sometimes my children buy things
on credit from the shops. We are 3,000 Afs
in debt to the shopkeepers. We have taken
rice, oil and wheat from them. We also take
credit in cash. We are 3,000 Afs in debt from
the neighbours too. My husband took money
from them because we did not have anything
for household expenses. We have not repaid
them yet. I don’t know how my husband will
repay them. They come and ask for their
money and if we have money we repay them.
But if we do not have money we tell them
to give us some more time, when we make
money we will pay them”. Nevertheless,
Kobra did express confidence in finding credit
when needed.
3.3 Case studies from middle-
ranking households
CS76-Ghor: Mortgage to marry
Reza lives with his second wife and three
small children in the Ghor village. They own
their house, own a little less than one jerib
of irrigated land and a little over a jerib of
rain-fed land, two cows, three sheep and a
donkey. Although not a wealthy family, six
years ago Reza had a good economy when
his brother and father were still alive. They
had just returned from Iran with some savings,
they built their house, and with some extra
loans they were able to marry Reza to his
first wife. As Reza puts it: “We were three
men who worked, there was no time for
debt.” However, misfortune struck: first, his
wife died giving birth to their first child. Soon
afterwards, both his father and brother also
passed away. Reza suddenly found himself
on his own. He mortgaged his rain-fed land
CS76-G: Debt portfolio
Credit types: in-kind loan with profit, delayed
payment of goods and mortgage
Repayment: sale of livestock or livestock
products, through labour
Amount – credit source - credit use:
1,400 Afs worth of wheat – in-laws – food
8,000 Afs – shopkeeper – food
10,000 Afs – villager – mortgage to marry
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to pay for the bride price for his second wife,
Khadija. That land has been in mortgage for
five years now. However, with the change of
currency in 2002 and the increasing value of
land, he transferred his mortgage to another
mortgager. He took an advance from the new
mortgager to repay the old outstanding
mortgage. As the land value had risen, he
was able to mortgage less land for the same
amount of money. Now, he has yet to repay
his new mortgage but has more land to use
for his own consumption.
Besides working on his own land, Reza takes
on casual labour in the village. He cannot
leave the village for long to work as a daily
labourer because there is no one to take care
of his family while he is gone. Occasionally,
Reza is forced to buy food on credit when
there is not enough food for the family. If he
cannot pay in cash or barter his debt with
qurut (dried cheese), he will work for the
shopkeeper. Last winter, Reza did not have
enough food and they needed to borrow
wheat from his in-law. They agreed that he
would repay in cash and not in-kind and for
a higher cost than the prevailing price: instead
of 70 Afs per ser (seven kg) he has to repay
100 Afs per ser. Reza expresses his intent:
“If I have surplus from my own land I will sell
it and repay my in-laws, if it is not enough
I will sell livestock or I will work and make
money for them.” He has to repay these
debts this working season. However, Reza
already thinks he would not have enough
food for this winter and that he would again
have to go to his in-laws to ask for wheat on
loan.
CS40-Kapisa: Mortgage for survival
Abdul Wahid owns three jeribs of land, and
is the second largest landowner among all
respondents interviewed in the Kapisa village.
However, he is far from a wealthy man.
During the drought he could not cultivate his
land for three years and there was little work
to be found. With a family of 12 he needed
money to buy food. “First I borrowed money
from someone in the village. But then he
regularly came to ask for his money, so I
decided to mortgage my land to him instead.
I mortgaged it for 40,000 Afs (US$800) for
each jerib of land. Now we are 120,000 Afs
(US$2,400) in debt.”
After this the family moved to Kabul for a
year where Abdul Wahid started working as
a daily labourer. But two years later they
moved back to the village as life in Kabul
became too expensive. He now sharecrops
his own land on a 3:1 basis and works as a
daily labourer in Kabul 20 days each month.
His eldest son works on the land. Still they
sometimes do not have enough income for
two or three months; they then borrow extra
food from a shopkeeper in the bazaar who is
a childhood friend of Abdul Wahid. They have
an outstanding debt of between 4,000 and
5,000 Afs (US$ 80-100).
Abdul Wahid wants to regain his own land
again but with the income he gets from daily
labour, 150 to 180 Afs per day, he cannot
save money. He needs it to provide for the
daily needs of his family. His eldest son of
17 and says: “The right solution is to sell one
jerib of land and from that money we can
pay back the mortgage. We would get 150,000
Afs (US$3,000) for one jerib.” His father’s
response is: “Now [the mortgager] does not
want to buy, he wants his money back. But
maybe I could sell it to other villagers.” There
is a slim chance, however, that other villagers
will be able to pay such an amount. Abdul
Wahid also stressed he would need extra
income to start cultivating his land again to
cover the cost of, for instance, seeds,
fertilizers, and the ploughing. Abdul Wahid
asks: “What shall I do with land now?” 
CS40-K: Debt portfolio
Credit types: delayed payment of goods and
mortgage; also provides cash and in-kind credit
Repayment: cash, for mortgage possible sale
of part of land
Amount – credit source - credit use:
4 – 5,000 Afs – shopkeeper – food
120,000 Afs – villager – food
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and sometimes borrow onions or vegetables
that they pay for later. Abdul Fatah says: “It
[produce from their small garden] is actually
not enough for selling but when they ask we
cannot say no.”
3.4 Case studies from wealthy
households
CS63-Ghor: Credit to invest in social
relations
The household of Zainab is wealthy. They
have 25 jeribs of rain-fed land, three cows,
one donkey, 15 sheep and a motorbike. Her
second son, Momeen, goes to school in Lal
everyday. He wants to become a doctor or
CS23-Herat: Credit networks
Abdul Fatah is a teacher in the Herat village.
He lives with his wife and two sons, his
parents and unmarried brothers. He has two
other older brothers who live on their own
somewhere else in the village. They own half
a jerib of irrigated land on which they
cultivate vegetables and alfalfa. The income
he gets as a teacher is not enough, this is
why he is also sharecropping two jeribs of
land at the same time and the household
breeds sheep.
Usually Abdul Fatah receives his salary every
month, but sometimes it is late and he takes
credit from his brothers or neighbours. These
same people also come to him when they
themselves need money. Nearly every month
Abdul Fatah buys food items on credit from
the shopkeepers and repays them when he
receives his salary. He says he does not pay
higher prices because he settles the debts
every month. Abdul Fatah also gives in-kind
credits to close relatives or neighbours, the
same people he would go to when he needs
to borrow money. Colleagues from school
also come to Abdul Fatah to borrow wheat,
CS23-H: Debt portfolio
Credit types: delayed payment of goods and
cost-free cash and in-kind loan; also provides
cash and in-kind credit
Repayment: cash
Amount – credit source - credit use:
? Afs – shopkeeper – food
(? = unknown amount)
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In credit networks, the same family members and neighbours who provide loans also engage in in-kind borrowing,
particularly of food staples such as vegetables and wheat.
My daughter is 20 years old, the age for
marriage The price is very low: 70–80,000
Afs.”
CS12-Herat: Credit to assist and make
money
When the fieldstudy was conducted, Akbar
Khan was chosen as the new arbab of his
village. He is the son of the old khan in the
community and was then still living in the
family’s large old qala (a walled, fortress-
like compound). As his father had lost all
their land, Akbar Khan had first worked as a
teacher after which he became a shopkeeper
and businessman. He started this shop with
a partner, a shariq (business partner who
provided investment on credit; see list of
credit types in Appendix 2 for more detail),
who was an old friend.
Akbar Khan was the only respondent who
openly stated he gave credit: “I give a lot of
credit.” During the drought and the Taliban
reign, he sold material for carpet weaving
and provided many households with the raw
material on credit, or provided them with
advances on their carpets. “They were in
need. When I know people are very much in
need I help them with credit.” He says he
does not force people to repay their debts if
they do not have the means to do so. “I do
not want them to sell their daughters.” And
he stressed how if he forced people to repay
he would lose the profit he would receive
from God by helping people—the sawab. He
also never discusses with the people who are
indebted to him when or how they will repay.
He states how families who are chronically
indebted are supported by the community
through zakat, khairat and komak that people
teacher later. The household has an
outstanding debt with shopkeepers in the
bazaar. Zainab makes qurut with her sister
in-law, which her husband often takes to the
bazaar to sell or barter “but most of the time
he uses it to repay our debts.”
Recently Momeen married the daughter of a
wealthy landowner from the main valley.
Zainab explains how this came to be: “My
son fell in love with the daughter of this big
landowner. He asked his father to marry him
to that girl. At first the landowner did not
want my son to marry his daughter, so he set
a high bride price thinking we could not pay
it. But we were able to pay it. The bride
price was 120,000 Afs (US$1,400) as well as
20 ser (one ser = 7 kg) wheat, 30 ser rice, 8
ser oil and 20 sheep. For getting all these
things my husband borrowed 80,000 from my
brother-in-law (Zainab’s sister’s husband)
who just received a bride price for his
daughter. The credit is qarz-i-hasana. We
still need to repay the remaining 40,000 Afs
for the bride price. We are also 20 sheep in
debt. From last year’s surplus we saved to
pay for the wheat, rice and oil. We gave it
all to the bride’s family.” Zainab says that
after giving the food items for the bride price
she is not sure they will have enough food
for the coming winter: “We will wait and see
and otherwise sell some livestock. And if that
is not enough we will buy some food on
credit.” When asked how they will repay such
high debts Zainab replies: “We don’t know.
CS12-H: Debt portfolio
Credit type used: business credit
Credit types provided: delayed payment of
goods, business credit, cost-free loans,
suspected credit with interest.
Repayment: cash
CS63-G: Debt portfolio
Credit types: delayed payment of goods and
bride price and cost-free cash loan
Repayment: possible bride price for daughter
Amount – credit source - credit use:
? Afs – shopkeeper – food
80,000 Afs – brother in-law
40,000 Afs – bride’s father – remaining bride
price
20 sheep – relatives – part of bride price
(? = unknown amount)
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give to those families. “Within Islam the rich
should help the poor.” Although not confirmed
by Akbar Khan himself, other respondents
shared their concerns that he was likely
providing loans with interest to businessmen
in the village.
Akbar Khan has a network of households with
whom he gives and takes credit. This network
was established when he was a shopkeeper.
When asked to identify them, Akbar Khan
replies: “Families with whom we exchanged
daughters, neighbours we have made close
to us through family relations.” Akbar Khan
was a wealthy man, who had established
good relations as a teacher, shopkeeper and
businessman in the village: “I had good
relations as a shopkeeper and want to keep
them as arbab.”
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4. Key Dimensions of Informal Credit
As illustrated by the individual case studies
in the previous chapter, informal credit is
embedded in a set of social relations at the
household and wider community level. It is
widely used in all three villages, mainly for
consumption smoothing and for getting
married. But how general are the practices
reported by the household case studies and
how does one understand the differences
between households and communities with
respect to access to and use of informal
credit? This section aims to build on the
specific examples discussed in Section 3 and
explore more generally the importance of
informal credit in rural livelihoods in the
study villages, the diversity of practices, how
households do and do not get access to
different types of informal credit and the
contractual basis (repayment terms) and
outcomes of taking informal credit. As will
be made clear, informal credit practices are
not fixed but are undergoing a process of
change.
4.1 Pervasiveness of
informal credit
On the question of how widespread the use
of informal credit in rural livelihoods is, the
answer is simple: all households both take
and give informal credit. Only one household
(CS28-H), a poor widow in the Herat village
living on alms reported not taking or providing
credit. Nevertheless, she admits that when
she goes to households for alms she requests
credit out of pride even though she always
receives alms. Most households interviewed
reported both giving and taking credit, having
multiple outstanding debts simultaneously
and having a variety of different households
with whom they exchanged credit.
In the Herat village, all households except
that of the old widow (CS28-H) have networks
of credit relations; households that one might
approach to ask for credit could very well be
needing credit for themselves. Abdul
Shekabanee (CS9-H), a wealthy farmer,
observes: “Credit relations are like this;
sometimes you give sometimes you get.”
Another middle income farmer, Dillawer Khan
(CS11-H), describes credit relations as;
“People who receive or give credit are
specified, they are known to one another. If
I go to a house for credit and he does not
have it, I go to another. These are people I
too have given credit to.” Credit relations
among the middle-ranking and wealthy
households are often among family relations,
neighbours, colleagues and friends. But giving
and taking credit was not only practiced by
the middle-ranking and wealthy households.
Baser Ahmad and Kobra (CS25-H) mentioned
they too give food to poor households when
they can. Outstanding debts were largely
found among the middle-ranking and poor
households (see Table 2).
In the Kapisa village credit relations and
practices were mainly found within extended
family networks (paternal or maternal) and
kin networks (tribal segments). Within both
these types of networks, credit forms included
reciprocal exchanges of small in-kind and
cash credit, as well as provision of credit to
poorer families by wealthier households.
Habibullah (CS57-K), a mullah and small
farmer in a neighbouring village explains:
“We give and take credit between my
brothers. And we gave credit to our maternal
cousin... if there is a bad situation we
ourselves also take credit.” Agha Mohammed
(CS56-K), a teacher and small farmer, explains
how “within our qawm (tribal segment) you
have four taifas (lineage)—every taifa has
their own credit and assistance relations.”
However, those receiving credit from more
wealthy households also provide credit when
possible and requested. Sharif (CS59-K), is a
poor shoemaker, who himself is heavily
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Table 2. The range and average amount of outstanding debts by location and wealth
group
Share of Wealthy Middle Poor
HHs with
outstanding Average Debt range Average Debt range Average Debt range
debts debt debt debt
N=12 households N=10 households N=9 households
8% with outstanding debt(s)11 60% with outstanding debt(s) 68% with outstanding debt(s)
Herat:
41% <100 Afs 1,000 Afs 20,100 Afs 3,000-50,000 Afs 27,500 Afs 700-150,000 Afs
<2 US$ 20 US$ 402 US$ 60-1,000 US$ 550 US$ 14-3,000 US$
(3,200 Afs)12 (700-18,000 Afs)
(64 US$) (14-36 US$)
N=3 households N=22 households N=5 households
Kapisa:
67% with outstanding debt(s) 68% with outstanding debt(s) 60% with outstanding debt(s)
67% 20,000 30,000 Afs 23,300 Afs 4,500-124,000 7,800 Afs 4,000-30,000 Afs
Afs 600 US$ 466 US$ Afs 156 US$ 80-600 US$
400 US$ 90-2,480 US$
N=3 households N=22 households N=7 households
100% with outstanding 77% with outstanding debt(s) 43% with outstanding debt(s)
Ghor:     debt(s)
89%
59,300 Afs 8,000-120,000 Afs 20,900 Afs 4,000-60,000 Afs 5,700 Afs 10,000-20,000 Afs
US$ 160-2,400 US$ 418 US$ 80-1,200 US$ 114 US$ 200-400 US$
indebted and had to sell his mortgaged land
yet, at times, he provides his services on
credit.
Credit in the Ghor village is provided by both
relatives, as well as by wealthy villagers.
Compared to the two other villages, giving
and taking credit was practised but at a
smaller scale and it was mainly in-kind. Ghor
was the village with the most interviewed
households having outstanding debts (see
Table 2), which are mainly owed to
shopkeepers since the drought.
The fact that households both give and take
credit, as the credit networks in Herat
illustrate, indicates that there are not strict
or exclusive creditor–debtor definitions.
Although the poor household of Baser Ahmad
and Kobra (CS25-H) struggles to make ends
meet, it still manages to give in-kind credit
to other poor households when possible. It
is this same household that expressed so
much confidence that they would be able to
find credit when needed, even though they
were currently facing some major income
shortages. Many other households in the
sample also expressed this confidence (for
example, Gulab Khan and Farida, CS44-K,
presented in the Introduction). There were
few households that were unable to access
credit and were considered vulnerable, as a
respondent in Ghor (CS78-G) mentioned,
11 This amount is highly improbable. However, wealthy households were not as eager to reveal their debts in comparison with
households from other wealth groups in Herat.
12 This average of 27,500 Afs of debt per poor household is skewed. In this sample, one household (CS31-H) had fallen into
poverty, and still has outstanding debts amounting to 100,000 Afs (2,000 US$). The other family is a female-headed household
(CS24-H), which, over a course of five years, has accumulated a debt of reportedly 150,000 Afs (3,000 US$) from a shopkeeper
who is a relative. Given the bride price of her daughter, it is most likely that either it will repay the debt, or the daughter
will marry her relative’s son. In hindsight, this household most probably does not belong to the poor wealth group. The
remaining eight households form the poor wealth group in the Herat village, have outstanding loans between 700 Afs and
18,000 Afs, which is, on average over the eight households, a debt of approximately 3,200 Afs (64 US$).
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because they had no relation to go to for
credit. The confidence in obtaining credit—
of being able to find the money—appears to
be balanced by a certain confidence in being
able to manage the debt. Kobra (CS25-H),
for example, who at first said she did not
know how they will repay the credit they had
recently taken, then went on to say: “If we
do not have money we will tell [the lenders]
to give us more time, when we make money
we will pay them.”
During the drought there are reports of high
debts being considered shameful.13 However,
in all three locations, indebtedness was never
presented as shameful but more as something
quite normal. This difference may lie in the
improved ability to repay the debts (which
will be discussed further in Section 4.5).
However, cases were found where large and
multiple debts were presented with pride.
For instance, Zainab (CS63-G) describes with
pride how the family of her son’s bride had
set a high bride price before the wedding,
thinking they could not afford it, and how
they managed to pay through credit from
relatives.
4.2 Diversity of informal credit
Given the widespread use of informal credit,
it is not surprising that there is great diversity
in informal credit practices.14 However, it is
not easy to identify clear categories, either
in terms of the conditions under which
informal credit is taken, or the way it is put
to use. And the definition of categories
respondents gave vary, as will be elaborated
in the next section.
Diversity in categorising credit
Interestingly, the male shura of Kapisa on
the first day of field study when asked what
kind of credit types there were, replied that
there were two kinds of credit; credit
provided within the qawm (tribe, but also
referred to community) and credit provided
by “outsiders.”
Table 3.  Share of households receiving credit (by credit type and wealth group)
Wealthy Middle-ranking Poor
Location Herat Kapisa Ghor Herat Kapisa Ghor Herat Kapisa Ghor
and number 12 3 3 10 22 22 9 5 7
of HHs
Delayed 62% 33% 100% 78% 50% 95% 90% 100% 71%
Payment
Advances 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 86%
Cost-free 23% 100% 66% 78% 73% 0% 6% 80% 0%
loans
Loans with 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 0%
profit
Mortgage 15% 33% 0% 11% 50% 45% 10% 20% 0%
Business 46% 100% 0% 11% 14% 0% 0% 1% 0%
credit
13   Lautze, S., E. Stites, N. Nojumi, and F. Najimi, 2002. Qaht-e-Pool: A “Cash Famine”: Food Insecurity in Afghanistan
1999–2002. Medford, MA: Tufts University FIFC, http://famine.tufts.edu/research/natsios.html.
14 See Appendix 2 for descriptions of all credit types found over the three case villages.
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Cost-free credit was sourced from within the
community or tribal unit, while credit
provided with costs or profit attached to it
was sourced from outsiders. This last category,
credit with profit or where costs are charged
is called qarz-i-sudh and considered sinful.
By the end of the field study it was clear this
was an ideal and that in practice those
providing mortgages were from within the
qawm. For instance, Mohamadullah (CS34-
K), member of the shura and present when
the shura discussed their classification, was
the main source of mortgages in the village.
He had provided a mortgage to his cousin,
Sharif (CS59-K) who had fallen more and more
in debt over the last five to six years. With
little prospect of recovery he sold his land
to repay the mortgage. Thus, the ideal and
practice are not necessarily the same thing.
Credit is often categorised by respondents
based on if and what kind of “profits” are
gained by the lender. Based on this principle
three credit groups can be identified; qarz-
i-hasana, which is cost-free credit that will
be rewarded by God, though repayment is
expected; qarz-i-sudh, which is credit where
profit is made and costs or interest is charged,
considered a sin according to Islam; and qarz-
i-khodadad, which is cost-free credit that is
not expected to be repaid by the borrower
but “repayment” will be provided by God as
reward (see Section 4.3 for more detail).
However, qarz-i-sudh and qarz-i-hasana are
flexible labels given to different credit forms
in different locations. In all three locations,
sudh was largely referred to as the credit
provided by shopkeepers when buying on
credit. The marked-up price is the sudh. This
should be contrasted to poppy growing areas,
where buying on credit from shopkeepers
was considered qarz-i-hasana15 and salam
practices (a harvest of opium poppy being
sold in advance for lower than market prices)
as qarz-i-sudh. It seems that qarz-i-hasana
and sudh are labels attached to certain credit
forms in relation to other forms of credit
available within a locality.
Another example is the different perceptions
of mortgage and its costs. In Kapisa people
referred to mortgage as sudh, because the
products of the land go to the one providing
the mortgage until the mortgage is repaid.
This produce is viewed as profit which is
considered sudh. In Herat, however, there
was no reference to mortgage as being sudh.
In the Ghor village respondents often referred
to mortgage when asked about sudh; however
its practice was not hidden and full of secrecy
as it appeared to be in the Kapisa village.
The secrecy around the sourcing of mortgage
in Kapisa is likely related to the newly
acquired status of Mohamadullah (CS34-K)
who provides mortgages. Although his father
was a landless sharecropper, he himself had
gained wealth through a military check post
and is currently obtaining wealth and power
through credit. Therefore in understanding
and classifying informal credit one needs to
be aware of two dimensions: the first is the
difference between the ideal and actual
practice, and the second is the different
meanings attached to different credit
practices between the three locations and
over time.
For the purposes of this paper different
informal credit forms have been classified
and labeled according to the way credit is
taken or provided (delayed payment, advance
payment, or credit from a third party), the
terms, costs, collateral and the unit(s) of
exchange. The following credit types were
identified:
• delayed payment of goods or wages
• advances on wages
• reciprocal cost-free in-kind and cash
loans
• cash or in-kind loans with profit
• mortgage
• business credit
• credit with interest
15 Mansfield, a personal account, 2006.
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The details of these are compared and
contrasted in the matrix in Table 4.
A detailed description is presented in the
Annex section.
Diversity across locations
As Table 5 shows, not every credit type was
practised in each location, or by each wealth
group in a location. Business credit and credit
provided with defined interest, for instance,
was only found among the sample in the
Herat village, which is probably due to the
level of business and trade in the village.
However, in the Ghor village two credit types,
loans with profit and advances on wages,
were found that were not reported in the
other two villages. An explanation for this
could be that the Ghor village is largely based
on barter exchange and therefore lacks
available cash. A respondent from the Ghor
village (CS70-G) mentions how: “The credit
situation was better before the drought.
People had money and were lending money
Table 4.  Matrix of criteria for differentiating informal credit types
Credit Criteria
types Sources Range of Financial/ Timeframe Repayment
value material gain
Delayed • Shopkeepers Variable Variable marked- Variable; One • Credit provided in-kind
payment • Itinerant up price month - one • Credit repaid in cash
• traders season • or through barter
Advances • Large Variable Cheap labour One agricultural • Credit provided in wheat
(G) • landowners (found up (profit) season • Credit repaid in labour
to 280 kg Dependent
wheat) workers (cost)
Cost-free • Relatives Variable No costs/profit Varies: one week; • Credit provided in cash
loan • Neighbours (found up several months; • or kind
• Friends to 80,000 several years • Credit repaid often in
• Colleagues Afs = 1,600 • same unit
US$)
Loan with • Relatives Variable Profit is from One agricultural • Credit provided in wheat
profit • Wealthy (found up pre-determined season • Credit repaid in cash or
• villagers to 2,000 Afs higher value/ • labour
= 40 US$) price
Mortgage • Wealthy Between Use of land Three-year • Credit provided in cash
• villagers, 6,000 and contract; in • Credit repaid in cash
• Relatives 120,000 Afs practice, a
• In-laws (G) (120-2,400 variable number
US$) of years
Business • Wealthy Variable Pre=determined Defined time, • Credit provided in cash
credit (H) • villagers (found up to share of profit defined project, • Credit repaid in cash
• Relatives 80,000 Afs = made from or timeless
1,600 US$) business
Credit • Business- no data Interest until Pre-determined • Credit provided in cash
with • men repayment timeframe • Credit repaid in cash or
interest (H) • Wealthy(H) • • kind
• villagers
G=Ghor; H=Herat
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Table 5. Types of informal credit practices reported (by location and wealth group)
Credit Wealthy Middle Poor
Herat Kapisa Ghor Herat Kapisa Ghor Herat Kapisa Ghor
Delayed payment + + + + + + + + +
Advances - - +(l) - - - - - + (l)
Cost-free loan + + + + + - + + -
Loan with profit + + + + + - + + -
Mortgage + (l) + (l) + (l) + (b) + (b) + (b) - - -
Business credit + - - + - - - - -
Credit with interest + - - - - - - - -
l=lender; b=borrower
same credit types but in contrasting ways or
perceived the same credit types in diverse
ways. This illustrates how a credit type can
be practiced or perceived differently on a
case-to-case basis. The two most striking
cases were that of “buying on credit” and
mortgage.
In the case of “buying on credit,” most
households interviewed thought that
shopkeepers who were providing their goods
on credit for “double prices,” were engaged
in practices of sudh. Some respondents,
however, were of a different opinion as in
the case of Abdul Fatah (CS23-H), a teacher
and sharecropper in the Herat village, who
described the credit practice as:
Local shopkeepers depend on their
customers and therefore give credit,
they know the villagers do not have
much cash...  Farmers pay every season
and they have to pay a bit more than
the original price. The longer it takes
the more expensive the prices get. It is
a kind of sudh. But shopkeepers are also
people in need; they too have to get
money to buy new goods. For instance
a bottle of tomato paste is 50 Afs, after
one season it becomes 60 Afs. But in
between the repayment, the shopkeeper
might need money to buy new goods,
they have to do this.
to each other but now it has changed and
people don’t have money to lend.” Another
explanation could be that there was little
trust in households being able to repay either
on time or in the unit provided so that when
credit is given, the risk is covered through
the costs.
The majority of households over all three
locations and wealth groups mentioned having
access to “buying on credit.” Households in
Kapisa reported making less use of “buying
on credit” than in the other two villages,
possibly because they had fewer “relations”
as shopkeepers in the district bazaars, and
the village shops did not sell wheat. Instead,
the Kapisa households relied more often on
borrowing money from relatives as qarz-i-
hasana.  In all three villages, poor households
did have access to “buying on credit” from
shopkeepers although the poor could rely on
it less often and with lower ceilings of
accumulated debt. Thus, although all wealth
groups reported having access to delayed
payment of goods, or in other words “buying
on credit” from shopkeepers, the actual
practice varies by wealth group.
Diversity in perceptions and
practices of credit
There were households in all three locations
and across wealth groups that were using the
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relationship between the buyer and the
shopkeeper.
Another example of differences in practices
is found with mortgaging. Mortgaging of land
was a frequently used credit type in all three
villages for those owning land during the
drought. For many landowners, mortgaging
out one’s land was a means to access large
cash credits, inaccessible without using land
as collateral for repaying accumulated debts.
This occurred in two ways; either accumulated
debts are repaid through a mortgage or a
mortgage is taken as a debt management
measure in order to regain access to short-
term credit through shopkeepers. For
instance, Abdul Wahid (CS40-K) owns three
jeribs of irrigated land that he had mortgaged
out during the drought. He narrates: “First
I borrowed money from someone in the
village... But then he regularly came to ask
for his money, so I decided to mortgage my
land to him instead.” Although it is likely
there was some form of pressure to repay
the outstanding cash debt in order to transfer
the debt into a mortgage, it also provided
an opportunity to manage his outstanding
debt. Many mortgages taken during the
drought are still outstanding and land has
not yet been retrieved even though the
repayment time has passed. It is as if these
debts are put on hold. This, however, is not
the case with all mortgages as the example
of Sharif (CS59-K) illustrates. He and his
widowed mother mortgaged their land also
during the drought, but were however
“forced” to sell it to the mortgager as
repayment. Understanding the differences
in repayment practices and the outcomes
between these two similar situations—which
will be elaborated on in Sections 4.5 and
4.6—requires looking at the larger  social and
economic context of the village.
However, mortgage is not a credit source
households seek only in times of distress. It
was also used in order to access large cash
sums to pay for high bride prices, which again
are inaccessible without using land as
collateral. This was found in all three
Asking respondents to be specific about the
marked up price often resulted in respondents
referring to “double-pricing” without being
able to say in detail what the marked up
value was as the shopkeeper was the only
one recording the debt and it was evidently
not a pre-determined higher price (CS78-G,
CS26-H). There may be cases (although not
specifically found) where marked-up prices
are “double,” in many instances it seemed
to be more often a “matter of speech.”
The costs of “buying on credit,” with a
marked-up value, is different by case and
changes over time as well. Abdullah (CS18-
H) used to have a butcher’s shop in the Herat
village but he closed it down two years ago
because nobody had money to buy meat
anymore. He describes how another butcher
in the village did not only have to close down
his shop but also remained in debt when
people did not pay their outstanding bills.
When I had a butcher shop in this village
I didn’t give credit to people, because
another villager also had a butcher shop
in the village and he gave a lot of credit
to people. But then the Taliban came
and everyone left the village for Iran
and Herat and this man could not find
money to pay the animal owner from
whom he bought the sheep for his shop.
So he left the shop and went to Iran and
worked there for four years. The money
he earned he gave to the sheep owners,
but still he didn’t receive his money
from the villagers he gave credit to.
No defined practice of mark-up pricing was
found in the study, although during the
drought, the debt burden of shopkeepers
increased, which affected access to “buying
on credit” and may have led to an increase
in the practice of marking up prices. The
marked-up value may be determined by a
number of circumstances: the overall debt
burden carried by the shopkeeper; the
prospect of debtors repaying in a timely
manner, as well as the prospect of repaying
in the longer term; and the nature of the
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Considering the different types and practices
of informal credit it is not easy to generalise
the role that informal credit plays in rural
livelihoods. This can only be understood by
taking into account the context of the
exchange and the parties involved. Why do
households engage in credit exchange?
4.3 Reasons for giving and taking
credit
The majority of households take credit to
overcome expected and unexpected lean
periods as well as to pay for marriages and
other life cycle events (see Box 1).
Credit for productive inputs and business
investments was only found in the Herat
village. Providing credit to gain more assets,
i.e. mortgaging someone else’s land, was
found in both Kapisa and Ghor. Besides these
locations: in both Kapisa and Herat half of
all households who had taken mortgages used
it to pay for marriage costs; in Ghor, two-
thirds of all households taking mortgages
used them to pay for marriage costs. What
was not encountered during the field study
in the Herat village but what respondents
mentioned occurred, was households
mortgaging their land to access large cash
sums to start businesses. Given that prices
per jerib of mortgaged land are based on the
value of the land, debts from mortgages
taken during the drought, when land values
were less, are lower than debts from
mortgages taken more recently to pay for
marriage costs. Mortgage is not used for just
one purpose, it is used in times of need as
well as a strategy to pay for otherwise
unaffordable undertakings—marriage or
business—and its repayment practices also
cannot be easily categorised (Section 4. 5
discusses this in more detail).
Box 1. Credit use
Consumption smoothing
Most households from all wealth groups of the sample, do not have a regular and secure income
and are periodically short of cash or food or face small-scale crises for which food or money is
needed. Families dependent on agricultural income sources dealing with seasonal lean periods,
families dependent on labour migrants for remittances, casual labourers in the lean time of
winter when there is little work in the village, teachers who receive their salary late, carpet
weavers before the carpet is completed and sold, or poorer households trying to cope with a
period where there is no or not enough income—all fall back on credit to overcome these lean
periods. Often, relatives and neighbours are approached to provide in-kind or cash credit. More
substantial income or food shortages, often encountered by the poor, were overcome through
credit provided as assistance from relatives, through credit from predominantly neighbours and
shopkeepers, or in Ghor through credit using future labour as repayment, or in Herat by asking
for credit but receiving alms if one is a recognised vulnerable person.
Life cycle events
Another common use of credit is to pay for expensive life cycle events like bride prices and
wedding costs. Considering the amount of money a household is willing to invest, marriage is
an important event. All recent post-drought mortgaging of land by respondents was to finance
expensive bride prices of which the highest reported was 150,000 Afs (US$3,000). One respondent
in the middle-ranking group, a teacher and farmer from the Kapisa village (CS56-K), replied
when asked about possible debts, that he did not have sons of marriageable age and therefore
did not have debts. Costs related to death of household members are also included here. Poor
households avoid wedding costs through sister exchange, marry cheap brides and in case of
illness and death rely more on charity to provide for these expenses. Use of credit for life cycle
events was common in all three locations but only among the middle-ranking and wealthy
households.
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H and CS21-H), where middle-ranking and
wealthy households had active networks with
households of equal standing to give and take
credit.
In the Ghor village, credit exchange was only
found among the wealthy households, and
only used for larger cash requirements. An
explanation for this is that their credit
networks often extended outside the village,
usually with relatives residing in other villages,
which does not facilitate frequent credit
exchange for consumption smoothing. The
give and take of credit between households
is based on expected returns and trust in
reciprocity. An explanation provided by many
middle-ranking households in the Ghor village,
as to why there was so little reciprocal cash
loans provided, was that there was no trust
people would repay. This “distrust” lay most
likely in not trusting that the loan will be
repaid soon or in the kind in which it was
borrowed and not for instance through labour.
Credit is a way to solidify existing relations
of mutual support or, when engaging in new
credit exchanges, a way to establish or
incorporate new relations within a network
of support. In Herat, Nuzamudeen (CS21-H),
a Kuchi settler, is actively establishing himself
as a trader via business credit and is planning
to align his family with specific families in
the village through marriage, thereby creating
new credit relations. The arbab from the
same village (CS17-H) confirms this when
describing with whom he has credit relations:
“...with those we have made close through
marriage.” But when the trust that the credit
will be repaid or the act returned in the
future disintegrates, credit relations can dry
up or fail as illustrated by the case of Baser
Ahmed (CS25-H) described in Section 3.
Marriage is thus an important event through
which households invest in social support
networks, as it provides a possibility to choose
a relation one wants to “get close with” and
facilitates credit relations as well as general
three main reasons to engage in credit, there
are additional underlying dimensions
explaining why households give as well as
take credit. Credit is also perceived as an
investment in mutual support, as a means of
providing assistance and also as part of a
system of patronage, and it may fulfil several
of these aspects at the same time. Yet even
this is not an exhaustive list of reasons for
credit exchange.
A. Credit as an investment in mutual
support
Deen Mohammed (CS33-K) is the main
shopkeeper in the Kapisa village. The family
was originally not wealthy but with savings
from Iran, they have been able to invest in
a shop and the village mill. Recently, his son
got married, and in order to pay the bride
price and wedding costs he needed to borrow
money, which he found from several different
villagers: “Because I have influence as the
shopkeeper and the miller, people brought
money to me to use for the wedding—around
3,000 Afs (US$60) each. It was all credit.”
Later he added: “If I did not have this shop,
they would not have given me money.” Why
would households give Deen Mohammed credit
for organising his son’s wedding? As Deen
Mohammed himself explains: “Because I am
the main shopkeeper.” Providing credit to a
shopkeeper is investing in, or re-enforcing,
a relation of support. He adds: “When
someone gives me 3,000 Afs when he is in
need [himself], I give him 10,000 Afs.”.........
As this case illustrates, credit can be provided
as a means to assist households in need of
cash or food but it is also a means to secure
assistance for the lenders when they need
credit themselves in the future. This giving
and taking of credit is more often found in
short-term credit provision for consumption
smoothing. However, as Deen Mohammed’s
example shows, wealthier households also
provide larger cash credits for life cycle
events to (re)establish credit relations. Similar
cases were found in the Herat village (CS17-
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failing family networks as Baser Ahmad (CS25-
H) faced when he became disabled; and on
the other hand, by receiving charity and
assistance credit from wealthy households.
Baser Ahmad again provides an example of
this, when he received 3,000 Afs credit from
his neighbours even when there was little
prospect for him to repay in the near future.
In the Kapisa sample, the provision of credit
to assist was mainly found within family and
larger tribal networks. The household of
Gulab Khan and Shafiqa (CS44-K), described
in the Introduction, is an example of having
ongoing support from relatives, often outside
of the village; in this case, households who
have moved to Charikar or Kabul. Qarz-i-
khodadad-like credit is not common in the
Ghor village, though it did occur. Zamen Ali
(CS70-G), himself a middle-ranking farmer,
mentioned how, “We have land, when we
harvest our wheat people come to us and we
give 1-2 ser (7-14 kg) of wheat as loan knowing
we will never get it back. Some give back
some don’t. But we know their life situation
is worse than ours.” Interestingly, no
respondents in Ghor expressed feeling
obligated to assist the poor, nor did the poor
report that they were relying on being
assisted. The reason may be related to a
credit practice where poor are “provided
for” but in an entirely different manner, as
the next section will illlustrate.
Assistance is a religious as well as a social
obligation as seen in certain expectations
expressed within the community. Obligation
and religious reward are, therefore,
underlying dimensions of giving credit to
needier households. Who is entitled to this
assistance, or who can claim this assistance
will be discussed in more detail in Section
4.4 on access to credit.
C. Credit as part of a system of patronage:
a means to security and social standing
In the Ghor village a specific credit relation
was found that was not observed in the other
mutual support. It provides an important
opportunity for households to strengthen and
broaden their range of support opportunities
and possible credit sources. Poor households
in Kapisa were marrying their daughters off
with no or low bride price with the
expectation that it will provide a source of
assistance in the future. Middle-ranking and
wealthy households go out of their way in all
three locations to collect or borrow enough
money to pay for the costs of bride price and
wedding, often going into significant debt as
the number of mortgages taken to finance
the event exemplifies (see also CS76-G, CS63-
G, CS33-K, CS20-K and CS21-H). This shows
marriage’s importance as a socio-economic
investment.
B. Credit as a medium of assistance
Whereas the previous point related to credit
being used as a means of building mutual
support mechanisms, which was largely
practiced between households of more or
less equal standing, credit was also a means
to assist other households; this was found
predominantly between households of
different wealth groups. This form of credit,
described as qarz-i-khodadad in Section 4.2,
is credit provided as assistance under the
agreement that if the borrower gets the
opportunity to repay, he or she will do so
but if not, the lender will receive repayment
“through God.” This term is not widely used,
although reference to it and its practice was
found in the Kapisa and Herat villages. In all
households in the sample, there was a general
understanding that wealthy families should
assist the poor, through charity, assistance
or by providing credit. During the fieldwork
the mullah in the Kapisa village, possibly
instigated by this study, preached at the
Friday sermon about the goodness of assisting
people through qarz-i-hasana, contrary to
mortgaging, which was considered a sin.
In the Herat village, poor households were
mainly characterised by, on the one hand
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the labourers having no other choices.
However, one cannot judge properly without
taking into account the possible advantages
this system of interdependency has for the
poor. As the livestock herds have not yet
recovered and many households are
supplementing their food income with
contract and daily labour, there is labour
surplus in the village. Of the 32 households
interviewed in the Ghor village 25 had a
household member working as a contract
labourer (thus excluding daily labour
opportunities). Contract labour can provide
a more secure and possibly greater income
than casual daily labour given the guaranteed
length of work it provides; a contract of eight
months provides for a strong adult 20,000
Afs (US$400) which is the equivalent of 133
days of daily labour at local rates, or over
four months of continual daily labour. More
risk-averse households will aim to smooth
their income streams by fixing a term of
employment, even for lower return, rather
than depending on the uncertain daily wage
labour market in a context of surplus labour.
Thus, binding oneself to a wealthy landowner
through debt and reserving ones labour can
be a desirable condition to secure a
household’s food security.
Interestingly, in the Ghor village, and also
found in the rest of Hazarajat,18 there were
examples of joint households where wealthy
families with large landholdings would live
together as one household with either
individuals, or in some cases with whole
families of those working for them on a
contract labour basis. Khodadad (CS65-G) is
a wealthy man with large land and livestock
holdings. He is an old man now, and though
he and his wife had seven children they all
died prematurely. “I have a mazdur (contract
two locations: a large landowner providing
advances on future contract labour to landless
households. As this was done on several
occasions throughout the year the labour of
a household could be fully reserved to one
landowner even before the agricultural season
starts. With this agreement, there is a
generally understood obligation from those
giving as well as expectation from those
receiving that the landowner should provide
credit for the labourers working for him.16
However, accumulated advances against
future labour and other possible debts with
the landowner can result in a state of bonded
labour. Gulbakht (CS25-G), who lives with
her elderly husband and three young sons in
the Ghor village, provides an example. The
family also has three daughters all of whom
are working and living in other households
repaying debts and advances taken. One of
Gulbakht’s daughters works to repay an
advance her father took two years ago. He
had fallen sick and was unable to provide
the work he had taken an advance for.
Although the old debt is not yet repaid,
Gulbakht just recently approached the family
where this daughter works to request more
wheat on loan, which was granted. Other
poor households have similar conditions, as
in the household of Safar (CS84-G) described
in Section 3. Thus, credit in the Ghor village
connects landowners with large land and
livestock holdings and in need of additional
labour to the landless through the provision
of advances on future contract labour.
Long-term contract labour is approximately
one-third of a daily wage and thus a landowner
gains access to cheap labour by providing
advances.17 This system can easily be
characterised as “exploitation”—providing
credit in order to access cheap labour with
16 The study from Semple, conducted in 1998 in the same region, also reports the expectation of landlords providing credit
to their tenants (1998: 38).
17 Contract labour ranges between 10,000 and 20,000 Afs (200 and 400 US$), a pair of clothes and food for eight months
whereby the person hired often lives together with the family hiring him or her. Converting the cash component to a daily
wage rate gives a daily rate of between 42 Afs and 83 Afs (between 0.82 and 1.66 US$). The rate is likely to be less when
contract labour is used to repay debts.
18 Mousavi, S.A., 1998. The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study, p.46. Surrey,
England: Curzon Press.
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especially given that there seems to be an
over-supply of labour in the village. This
might be related to lenders obtaining social
standing and political power within the village
by having others depend on them through
the provision of credit. The positive
perception of employing labour through
patronage relations is discussed in Tapper’s
study on marriage practices within a Pashtun
tribe in the 1970s.
It is dishonourable to sell one’s labour
for recompense in any form, while it is
honourable to employ labour, to have
clients and dependants, people to whom
produce is given in return for their
labour.19
In the Ghor village, wealthy households built
dependency relations through credit that
may have affected their social standing and
political power within the village. In Kapisa
and Herat, while patronage relations such as
those described above were not found, a
similar outcome of increased social standing
labourer) who is with me since he was a small
child. He came to me because he had no one
to look after him at that time. Now I have
brought a wife for him and he is with me.”
After this interview, a member of the research
team observed that the man working for
Khodadad was “a mazdur in exchange for
shelter, food and a wife.” Although, this was
not a common situation, it does illustrate
how bondedness also entails an element of
security; one obtains food and other forms
of security through dependency.
This credit practice was not found in Kapisa
or Herat, although respondents in Kapisa
reported that it did occur four to five decades
ago. An explanation for its decline is most
likely related to the changed land relations
and access to more diverse job opportunities
now found in Kapisa and Herat.
It is important to note that there seems to
be more to it for the lender than solely
accessing cheap labour or meeting religious
obligations by assisting poor households,
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Subsistence farming is an important livelihood but daily labour is still needed to augment income and food security.
19 Tapper, N., 1991. Bartered Bride; Politics, Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society. Cambridge.
through having credit-dependent households
was found. Among the members of each shura
in the three studied villages “big” lenders
were found. In the Herat village, the newly
chosen arbab was a known source of both
business credit as well as credit to assist. In
the pilot study conducted in a village in Balkh
province, the village mullah was a wealthy
big landowner and an important source of
credit for many villagers. Although he
described his motivation as religious, it is
not surprising he too was chosen as head of
shura. To what extent are the reasons for
providing credit based on altruism or self
interest? One can only speculate on a case-
to-case basis, but it is most likely to be a
combination of both. That all main credit
providers of the studied villages were also
members of the shura or the arbab illustrates
this.
There are several dimensions why households
give and take credit: one is, credit is used
to overcome expected or unexpected lean
periods and pay for expensive life cycle
events. However, credit is also used to
safeguard future access to credit and other
forms of support or assistance, either through
reinforcing mutual support relations, or within
a system of patronage to meet religious
obligations and to obtain social or political
rewards. But do all households have access
to the credit they want or need?
4.4 Access to informal credit
There are two striking findings in this study:
first, the majority of households from the
sample are able to access credit; and second,
the confidence that many households have,
including the poor, about being able to access
credit.
Shafiqa (CS44-K), the wife of the household
described in the Introduction, is confident
in knowing who to go to for credit and in
being able to access credit on good terms.
However, she is also confident that she will
actually receive credit when she asks for it,
even though at the time of the interview
there was very little prospect of income in
the near future. Her confidence was most
probably related to the household’s credit
source being her family and the obligations
to assist this implies. However, many similar
cases of confidence are found in Kapisa, as
well as in Ghor and Herat, even among non-
family credit sources. What is this confidence
based on?
In all three villages, households expressed
the expectation of being able to receive
credit and in some cases even expressed it
as an “entitlement,” as a right to access
credit. How this entitlement is expressed
varies according to the specific credit relation
a household is engaged in (mutual support,
assistance or patronage). Within mutual
support networks, which are often defined
by tribal or other blood relations, reciprocity
among the parties giving and taking credit is
the basis of claims to entitlement. For
example, the Kapisa village is divided into
several sub-clans called taifa. Within the
taifa, cost-free credit is exchanged. As a
teacher and middle-ranking farmer (CS56-K)
reported: “For example, if I ask Esmatullah
[a wealthy man from another taifa] for credit,
he will say no, even though he has money
because he would rather give credit to people
from his own taifa.” Wealthy households
reserve their surplus cash to provide for their
close relatives and fellow taifa members,
who in turn “claim" their right to credit from
within this group, knowing others within the
group can make claims on them. In the case
of assistance-related credit, as the obligation
to assist is embedded within Afghan society,
this obligation forms the basis of claims to
entitlement to credit. Similarly, within
patronage relations, claims to credit or
expressions of entitlement are based on the
obligations represented by the patronage
relation.
Entitlement, however, entails exclusion of
households that do not belong to the kin
group, mutual support group, or system of
patronage (lack a long-term tenure agreement
with a wealthy landowner). One respondent
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(CS78-G) in the Ghor village mentioned how
“vulnerable households are those who do not
know people who can help them.” Another
respondent, Anwar (CS83-G) sold his
household’s assets and was ready to migrate
to Herat the following day. Anwar explained
that his household was leaving the village
because the landowner they used to work
for as contract labourers, whose house they
lived in, had mortgaged his land. The new
creditor had hired other contract labourers
to cultivate the mortgaged land, leaving
Anwar unemployed. Equally severe was that
they had to vacate the house they were living
in, and had lost their main source of credit.
In one moment, Anwar lost his employment,
his place of residence and credit access due
to his patron’s fall in economic status. This
exemplifies the covariant nature of some
risks, particularly evident in a context like
the Ghor village, where livelihood inter-
dependency is high.
Poor households from the Kapisa village are
accessing credit from wealthier relatives in
and outside of the village. It is worth noting
that the research team did not come across
poor households lacking relations to assist
them. A possible explanation for this is that
the poor households would not have survived
within the village and such households may
have migrated out. However in the Herat
village, in cases where contacts had been
broken during the drought (CS25-H and CS21-
H), other entitlements are present, including
entitlement to charity. Baser Ahmad (CS25-
H) and Ghulam Mohammad (CS28-H), both
impoverished, reported how in the Herat
village there was a difference between those
considered vulnerable, i.e. the disabled and
female headed households, who were
generally perceived as “in need of assistance,”
and those who were poor or had been
impoverished but where the head of the
household was still an able-bodied male. The
first group had access to charity (mainly
khairat) whereas the second group did not
and instead had to access credit, which could
result in further impoverishment.   
The underlying reasons why households
engage in credit, as identified in Section 4.3,
are linked to entitlements to credit through
the need to reciprocate the action or through
social and/or religious obligation expected
by both lender and borrower, or as an integral
part of a system of patronage. These
entitlements explain the confidence
respondents expressed in accessing credit.
But once credit has been accessed it needs
to be repaid at some point. Where and how
do the households find the money?  
4.5 Repayment practices
“When we find the money, we will repay,”
is the common response by many respondents
when asked how they will repay their debts.
A good example is Gulab Khan and Shafiqa
(CS44-K) who are constantly borrowing money
and goods from Shafiqa’s relatives, especially
since Gulab Khan became unemployed
recently. With little prospect to repay in the
near future, the opportunity to “find the
money” lies, as Shafiqa states, in the future
income from the bride prices her four
daughters will most likely receive. In other
words “finding the money” seems to refer,
in this case as well as in many other cases,
to an undefined time in the future when the
opportunity to repay will arise. Repayment
practices in the three villages were found to
be highly flexible, as shown through the
examples of mortgage repayment and
repayment practices with shopkeepers in
Ghor.
Mortgage and repayment practices
Of the 26 households in the sample who
mortgaged land over all three locations, nine
were already able to retrieve it and three
reported having to sell their land or a part
of it.20 Respondents mentioned examples of
20 Of the nine households, which had once retrieved their mortgaged land, two had again mortgaged it out.
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more households who had sold their
mortgaged land, but as they had left the
village the dynamics and reasons around the
sales, and if they were somehow forced,
remains unclear. However, 16 of the 26
mortgages taken are still outstanding,
although the three year repayment timeframe
had passed. Why have some households sold
their mortgaged land to repay the debts
whereas others are able to keep outstanding
mortgages with apparently no pressure to
repay?
For instance, Sharif (CS59-K) now a shoemaker
alongside the main road used to be addicted
to hashish and did not work. To pay for
accumulating debts during the drought, he
had mortgaged his land to his uncle,
Mohamadullah (CS34-K). His mother, a widow,
was able to retrieve his land through the
bride price of one of her two daughters,
within the three-year repayment period.
However, falling further into debt for food
expenses they again had to mortgage their
land. Only this time when repayment was
due his uncle forced them to repay by selling
him a part of their land. Compare this
household’s situation with that of Abdul
Wahid (CS40-K) who had also mortgaged his
land during the drought and who is currently
still not able to retrieve it as the household’s
income is solely based on his daily labour and
the food produced from sharecropping his
own land. Nevertheless, as he has a large
family with both daughters and sons, the
future prospect is one of multiple income
sources, possible labour migration to Iran
and daughters who will marry and receive
bride prices. The difference between the
two households in the extent of repayment
pressure from the creditor lies in their very
different future prospects of repayment.
Households do take on risk when mortgaging
out their land. The creditor, once the
timeframe has passed, does have the right
to request his money back. If a debtor faces
more crises, the creditor might lose trust in
the future prospects of repayment, and in
response to the increasing risk of default,
demand his money back.
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Food expenses could push families further into debt; some households are even forced to mortgage land for repayment.
Accumulated debts from during the drought
In Ghor practically all households had large
outstanding debts of between 2,000 and
20,000 Afs (40 and 400 US$) with the
shopkeepers in the bazaar, accumulated from
the time of the drought. Given the extent of
long-term outstanding accumulated debts,
shopkeepers have been carrying a high burden
for their customers. The value of the
outstanding debt was not reported to be still
increasing (i.e. through interest charges),
though marked up prices may originally have
been included in the amount lent.
Interestingly, these indebted households
continued to be able to buy on credit; they
obtained this access through continued
repayment of current debts thereby both
obtaining more credit and avoiding being
charged excessive marked-up prices. For
instance, Zainab’s household (CS63-G) has
an outstanding debt with shopkeepers from
the time of the conflict and the drought.
However, her husband buys on credit every
winter which he often repays with livestock
products.  Thus, households seemed to have
two debts with a shopkeeper, one high
outstanding debt that seemed to be “put on
hold” and one active debt. The question
arises as to why creditors allow “default” in,
for example, mortgage repayment or for long-
term accumulated outstanding debts? The
answer most probably is to be found in the
social and/or religious obligation to assist.
Sharif’s (CS59-K) words of disgrace when
describing how his uncle, the creditor of the
mortgage, had forced him to repay and thus
sell his mortgaged land to him, exemplify
this: “All villagers know he took my land by
mortgage.”
Repayment practices are characterised by a
continuing trust and expectancy that the
debt will be repaid. This can take years, even
as long as waiting for the household to age
—for sons to grow older in order to work or
for daughters to get married and provide the
bride prices. However, repayment practices
are an ongoing “muted negotiation,” as they
do not always seem to be discussed. Their
flexibility can shift when on the one hand
the borrower is unlikely, even in the long
term, to repay the debt, or on the other hand
when the lender needs his money back. There
are three main factors that can affect the
situation of either lender or borrower, or
both simultaneously, and which trigger forced
repayment:
• Loss of income sources due to changes
in economy, conflict, or drought;
• Changes in household composition:
gradual, i.e. a large household with one
income provider but many potential
future income sources; or sudden, i.e.
with the death or illness of a household
member; and
• Increasing demands for assistance and
support from other households, and
decreasing returns from assistance
provided to others.
In the end, repayment practices are flexible
but contingent. When a debt is not repaid,
the credit agreement between lender and
borrower is adjusted according to the
changing situation of both parties, adjusting
to shifting relations and circumstances.
Nevertheless, renegotiation of repayment
can fail, though there is little evidence that
it currently frequently does. Repossession of
assets due to the failure to repay debt only
occurred for example in the case of Sharif
(CS59-K) when there was no prospect of
repayment in the future.
4.6 The outcome of credit
 practices
When looking at the general outcome of
credit practices, it is clear that many
households achieve what they want: they are
able to access food or money to meet their
immediate welfare goals and thus survive
and get by, or marry and meet their
investment needs. This section summarises
experiences at two ends of the spectrum of
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outcomes—those in decline and those who
prosper due, at least in part, to their use of
credit. Specifically, this section explores the
potential negative effects of crisis on credit
practices, and indirectly, on credit outcomes,
as well as how credit can provide
opportunities to prosper, though generally
among those already relatively asset rich.
The impact of crisis
In all three locations, impoverishment from
years of insecurity and conflict, followed by
four years of drought is widespread. Many
households are still recovering. There are,
however, two cases in all three locations of
households still in a process of decline: Sharif’s
household (CS59-K) in Kapisa, was forced to
sell mortgaged land to an uncle; and Ghulam
Mohammed (CS31-H), who has also mortgaged
his land and will most likely have to sell it
in the future due to a high burden of
outstanding debt. Baser Ahmed (CS25-H) is
an example of a household who has fallen
into poverty and has not been able to recover
but  has been able to stabilise its condition,
though at a lower level.
All households are at risk of experiencing a
crisis which can affect credit practices,
particularly repayment pressures or the nature
of assistance credit already received. Such
changes in practices can ultimately lead to
a decline in household security. Crises
affecting the lender or borrower can lead to
unexpected demand for debt repayment.
Lenders facing unexpected lean periods or
other downturns may call in debts to raise
needed cash or food or may remove patronage
ties (see CS83-G), while borrowers, who face
crises may lose credit worthiness in the eyes
of lenders, leading to demands for repayment.
Such demands can push borrowing households
into decline. Their ability to recover depends
on the depth and breadth of their credit
networks, as well as the condition of the
households with whom they have a relation
of mutual support. During the drought, when
practically all households faced problems,
mutual support networks started to
disintegrate. In Herat, there were cases like
Baser Ahmed’s (CS25-H), of families
abandoning their relatives in order to preserve
their own security, or to avoid depleting the
few resources left in their possession. Thus,
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Drought and conflict have changed credit practices over time. Borrowers, pressured to pay, are pushed into decline.
the break-up of mutual support networks,
often in the face of negative trends such as
drought or conflict, could further drive a
household into hardship, especially with
unexpected demands for debt repayment
that could force families to appropriate assets
if no other means existed to repay..............
In addition, not all credit provided under the
label of “assisting” lead to a positive outcome.
While perhaps given to assist a relation facing
a lean period or crisis, the nature of assistance
credit may change for a range of reasons,
from individual greed to larger societal shifts.
This shift was reported in Herat where people
have lost their assets, including daughters,
in order to repay accumulating debts. For
example, one female respondent in Herat
(CS19-H) mentioned how, at times, people
offer help only to reveal later on that the
assistance will be extended in exchange for
land or a daughter. This could very well be
a product of what has become a more
individualised economy in the Herat village
as a result of market development. With such
progress, social obligations “to assist” have
shifted towards helping through charity and
alms rather than through the provision of
long-term outstanding debts. Although debts
themselves may not be the direct cause of
impoverishment, the combination of
outstanding debt and crisis (affecting
borrower or lender) can lead to changes in
credit practices which can push households
into serious poverty, either through reduced
access to credit and support, or increased
repayment pressures.
Credit and its role in building prosperity
Aside from cases of households falling into
poverty, this study also came across
households recovering and actually gaining
wealth and prosperity through credit. One
example is the case of Mohamadullah (CS34-
K) in Kapisa, whose father had been landless
and who, through his wealth (accumulated
through work at a military checkpoint and
his subsequent ability to lend money) has
become the wealthiest man and main
mortgage provider of the village. Nuzamudeen
(CS21-H) is a Kuchi, who, after losing his
animals during the drought has settled in the
village. He is now a sheep trader and has
established within a few years trust among
villagers that they are now investing money
in his trading activities. Whereas his oldest
son is engaged to a girl from another Kuchi
family, he is now thinking of marrying his
second son to a family from within the village.
Credit has played a role not only in his attempt
to integrate but also in his efforts to prosper;
it is a medium exemplifying other households’
increasing trust in cooperating with him.
Since receiving business credit from wealthy
households within the village for sheep
trading, he himself says: “I have become
more trustworthy for them, people know I
am honest and that I can do a good job.”
Another example is the household of Zainab
in Ghor (CS63-G). Her household had taken
a large loan in order “to make close” with a
wealthy family through marriage, anticipating
future rewards from this connection via access
to new credit relations.
Opportunities of upward mobility through
credit were not found among poor households.
In general, opportunities to prosper came
from changing household composition and
mainly through the availability of more income
sources. This last change could eventually
lead to better access to other credit forms
and different credit sources. These are long-
term dynamics for households. However, as
the social and economic context has changed
considerably over the last four decades, so
too have credit practices in relation to their
use and role in household livelihoods for the
three villages.
4.7 The dynamics of informal
credit
This section examines how credit practices
have changed over time, due in part to the
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dynamics of conflict and drought and their
effects on households. However, equally
important are the changes in the regional
and village economy, including changes in
land relations, market penetration and
monetisation. These have influenced socio-
economic relations and household livelihood
strategies within the villages, increased the
overall standard of living and subsequently
changed credit practices. This is true for all
three study locations, but all in slightly
different ways. Whereas in Herat market
penetration has been found in the village
itself leading to a process of urbanisation, in
Kapisa and Ghor, economic change has been
mainly in the regional centres, especially in
the development of bazaars, and in Kapisa
the process of industrialisation in the Shomali
plain. These changes are explored by looking
at the practices of qarz-i-hasana, qarz-i-sudh
and mortgaging.
Trends in sudh and qarz-i-hasana
In all three villages, respondents referred to
changes in the use of qarz-i-hasana and sudh.
Respondents from Kapisa and Herat reported
a decrease in sudh and an increase in qarz-
i-hasana, whereas in Ghor, respondents made
few references to these credit types and had
the least to say about qarz-i-hasana. Bearing
in mind these terms vary in their meaning
and may indicate more perception than
practice (see Section 4.2), the question that
needs to be asked is: what are these changes
in use and what do they exemplify?
In the Kapisa village three to four decades
ago, the majority of landless (or small
landowners) were grain deficit households.
As no other households of equal standing had
surplus food to provide in-kind (qarz-i-hasana)
to make up for lean periods, most credit was
provided in-kind by the few large landowners
as sudh. Although no exact data on amounts
were provided, these food debts needed to
be repaid with marked-up values. Since then,
however, land relations have shifted, now
with a more equal distribution of small-scale
landholdings. The number of big landowners
has decreased and there are currently more
small landowners. Increasing job opportunities
in the vicinity of the village has resulted in
seasonal food shortages being compensated
through other sources of income and, if not
readily available, temporarily sourced through
qarz-i-hasana instead of with in-kind sudh.21
This process also went hand-in-hand with a
growing influence of the clergy like the mullah
and maulawi both under the Taliban rule and
in general from within the community. ........
In the Ghor village today, similar in-kind
credit, as practiced in Kapisa three to four
decades ago, is found where there is an
element of “gain” made, either through the
marked-up value of the debt, or through
repayment made through cheap labour. These
credit forms are advances (often in wheat)
on future labour or wheat loans for marked-
up prices in cash. As Section 4.3 illustrates,
credit in the form of advances on future
labour binds contract labourers and land-
owners in an interdependent relationship.
Though there is an element of gain here in
that the landowner providing the credit
accesses cheap labour, respondents
themselves do not refer to this credit form
as sudh. One respondent, a middle-ranking
farmer (CS78-G), mentioned how nowadays
there is no sudh but there is also no qarz-i-
hasana.
In the village in Herat, there is another story.
As the village economy is highly urbanised
with the majority of income sourced from
non-agricultural activities and through
income-generating activities in and outside
the community, the availability of cash is
widespread. Qarz-i-hasana is institutionalised
into networks of mutual support. This has
brought an increase in the importance of
21 A similar finding was found in Nangarhar. Due to an increase in poppy cultivation, more families had access to cash which
resulted in an increase in qarz-i-hasana opportunities (Mansfield, 2004).
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horizontal social networks, an increased
cooperation between households of the same
wealth ranking. Here too, respondents often
mentioned how there used to be a lot of sudh
and how it left the village. Although not
documented as well as in the Kapisa village,
the sudh referred to is most likely the same
in-kind sudh described above. Nowadays,
credit practises with an element of costs paid
or profit made were found mainly in “buying
on credit” with shopkeepers and referred to
by many respondents as sudh. Credit with
interest is practised for those confident
businessmen willing to take the risk of
investing in an enterprise on their own, and
confident they will be able to repay their
debts within the set timeframe. Changing
perceptions and “use” of credit types
reinforce the earlier discussion on how
concepts, such as sudh or qarz-i-hasana, are
not absolute but have meaning in relation to
other forms of credit available and from
whom.
Trends in mortgaging
There is a general trend found in all three
locations where mortgage was used during
the drought as a form of credit to pay off
accumulating debt, but which is now used
more as a planned action to access large cash
credits with the expectation of being able
to repay the debt and reclaim the land. From
the data collected in the three villages it is
unclear if this is a new trend or it is an old
practice revived.22
The practice of planned mortgage is an
indication that households have confidence
they will have the resources to be able to
retrieve their land; this trust is largely based
on the availability of daily labour opportunities
in the area, in Kabul, Herat and Iran. The
daily labour opportunities in the Ghor village
were not as abundant as within Kapisa village
but even there households planned their
mortgages to pay for bride prices. The
frequency of planned mortgage also might
indicate that the land within a household’s
economy—as source of food—has decreased
in economic importance as increasingly more
income is provided through casual labour.
When the proportion of food provision by the
land is relatively small and job opportunities
are available, households might be more
inclined to mortgage out their land, trusting
that the food source they are giving up could
“easily” be replaced by other income sources.
This is especially the case with larger
households in the Kapisa village, for example,
Abdul Wahid (CS40-K) who had mortgaged
out his land during the drought. He has a
large family to feed, and is now sharecropping
his own land. Both the income from his daily
labour and the products from the land are
enough to provide a stable income. Thus, it
is not surprising that Abdul Wahid doubts if
he should try and retrieve his land now by
selling a part of his three jeribs of irrigated
land. In order to retrieve his land, he will
need money; to provide inputs, he will need
additional cash and with a large family, the
land will not be sufficient to provide for the
whole family. Thus, he will have to continue
to work as a daily labourer.
Section 4 illustrates how informal credit is
widespread among all households of all wealth
groups. It is found in diverse types, the
majority of which is interest-free, provided
through different practices. The same forms
of credit could also be perceived in many
ways across locations and households. Informal
credit is found to be embedded in relations
of mutual support, assistance and patronage,
where access to credit is perceived as an
entitlement, leading to great confidence
across wealth groups in the ability to access
credit when needed. These new insights into
the workings of informal credit stand in stark
contrast with the assumption that there is a
widespread unmet demand for credit in
Afghanistan. The basis for these contrasting
perspectives is explored  in the following
section.
22 Semple, in his study on rural livelihoods in Hazarajat in 1998, p.42, does mention the practice of planned mortgage but
did not encounter it in 1998.
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5. Understanding Informal Credit
Section 4 has explored some of the key
dimensions of informal credit found in the
study villages. These findings raise some
fundamental questions about how informal
credit in Afghanistan is perceived and judged,
the extent this has been done through the
lens of formal credit, and whether this
characterisation does justice to the meaning
and practice of informal credit. This section
explores some of these questions considering
the preconceptions that are held with respect
to informal credit, how it is defined, its role
and its practices. Attention is also given to
the moral economy and the context of
insecurity that continues to drive and validate
informal credit practices.
5.1 Existing misunderstandings
and preconceptions
As discussed in Section 4, the complex
practice of informal credit as widely used in
the study sites—its diverse forms, the subtle
nature of access that reveals no absolute
entry barriers, its shifting nature over time
and its multi-dimensional outcomes—may
frustrate those looking for simple stories or
truths. Expectations of such tidy stories and
truths about levels of debt and indebtedness,
unreasonably high interest rates and calamity-
driven exigencies have been created as a
result of research based on formal
questionnaires that strip away the contingency
of complex household relations, settings,
value systems, perceptions about
uncertainties and time.
A questionnaire could have been constructed
for this study and data collected to
accommodate such premises as: debt is a
quantifiable variable for households; that
families would readily share how much debt
they owe (a deeply problematic assumption);
that there are clear distinctions between
lenders and borrowers; and that interest
rates are known to and therefore calculated
by borrowers. But the product from such an
approach would be essentially proof of its
assumptions and evidence of its method, and
would not reflect the complex realities of
informal credit practices presented in this
report.
The reality of debt associated with village-
level credit is its multi-dimensional and
variable nature—in a word, its complexity.
As Polly Hill, the eminent Cambridge
anthropologist puts it:
It is because... the nexus of personal
relationships involving borrowing and
lending is complex, exists on so many
levels, has so many functions and
entangles nearly everyone... that even
[an] outline... is a deliberate over-
simplification, [that] must seem to lose
itself in its own subject matter; ...“the
debt” which is supposed to adhere to so
many households is an illusory, every-
changing, at the best of times elusive
concept which cannot possibly be caught
by a questionnaire or any other form of
quantitative butterfly net. Only
qualitative enquiry, suggesting general
magnitudes, will do (emphasis in
original). (1986:93)
Related to the problem associated with the
primarily quantitative methods often used
to describe and understand informal and
formal credit is the language that is used to
describe it: informal credit is always
understood in terms of debt, giving it a
somewhat  negat ive  meaning  and
connotations.  Micro-credit, on the other
hand, talks in terms of credit creation, not
debt imposition and is therefore viewed as
positive and beneficial. Labels such as credit
and debt, as well as formal and informal are
not neutral and can influence research
practices and outcomes.
Hill in her chapter, “The Need to be Indebted”
takes issue with the image that has been
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projected of “creditors [being] wicked
rapacious scoundrels” (1986: 84) and debt
being abnormal. She develops her case for
the limits of quantitative enquiry, particularly
if informed by such views from the start:
The number of farmer-creditors in any
community must always be considerable,
though such is the coyness of creditors
that it is never ascertainable. As for the
number of debtors, this is invariably
very high, both because debt is a natural
condition and because... people often
borrow with one hand (for one purpose)
and lend with another. For all sorts of
good practical reasons people do not
think in terms of the net balance of debt
or credit... which means the bald terms
of debtor and creditor are often
meaningless, especially as the biggest
creditors are often the biggest debtors.
The evidence that emerged from this study
supports this assessment: labels of creditor
and debtor, which emphasise the financial
dimension of the transaction, ignore the
social aspects of it and the fact that a
household can be a creditor and debtor at
the same time. It cannot be assumed that
borrowing and lending relationships enhance
existing inequalities in rural communities.
While credit-based relationships may reflect
and maintain basic inequalities, they did not
necessarily create them.
Why should debt be seen as a natural
condition? In contexts of markedly seasonal
and marginal agrarian economies, where
employment and food production activities
have distinctive peaks and troughs, it is
inevitable (as Hill observed while working in
dryland areas of Karnataka in India and as
found in the cases reported here) that many
households will not always be self-sufficient
for a whole year. The unpredictability of
weather, calamities and other unforeseen
events create challenges and crises that are
simply hard to plan for. Borrowing is normal
to meet the needs resulting from such
situations, as seen in the unique set of
household panel studies undertaken by
ICRISAT23 and the extent of risk-sharing
practiced within villages studied.
There is widespread belief in the microfinance
field in general and in Afghanistan that there
is a very strong demand for credit, and that
much of this demand is unmet by existing
informal or formal credit services. It is unclear
to what extent this belief is  a legacy of the
drought and assertions made at that time
that there was a cash famine24 which
hindsight indicates may have been
overstated.25 Could this notion be driven
more by perceptions of the role of opium
poppy? This is not the place to explore
questions of method or the validity of
assumptions made and data produced in these
studies. But the objective of extending
microcredit within Afghanistan, particularly
under the MISFA program as under other
CGAP-related microfinance interventions
globally,  is to increase access to financial
services among the poor.26 This aim has also
been integrated into Afghanistan’s main policy
documents, the Afghanistan Compact and I-
ANDS, through a rural development
benchmark of increasing access to financial
services for 800,000 households by end 2010.
These policy-backed initiatives presume a
lack of access to credit in rural Afghanistan—
a premise that is not supported by the results
of the household case studies conducted in
Herat, Kapisa and Ghor.
23 International Centre for Research in the Semi-Arid Tropics, carried out between 1974 and 1984 in the dry zones of India;
see, for example, the discussion by Jonathan Murdoch, 2002. Consumption Smoothing Across Space, Discussion Paper,
2002;55. World Institute for Development Economics Research.
24 Lautze, Stites, Nojumi and Najimi, 2002.
25 Johnecheck, W., 2007. “The Evolution of Food Security Information in Afghanistan: A case of limited ‘availability’, ‘access’
and ‘utilisation’,” in Pain and Sutton (eds), Reconstructing Agriculture in Afghanistan; 69-73. ITDG Press.
26 See for example CGAP, 2003. “Helping to Improve Donor Effectiveness in Microfinance: Rural Financial Services for the
Poor,” Donor Brief No. 15, October 2003.
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What is clear however from the evidence in
the case studies is that most respondents
know “where to find the money” and how to
get access to it, contrary to the view of
Rasmussen27 with respect to informal credit
in Afghanistan. He asserts that “access is the
main constraint, not the price,” although
again this view may be a consequence of
perceptions of post-drought rural Afghanistan.
Informal credit appears to be widely available
and the evidence is that it is only the really
poor (see household CS25-H) who cannot get
access, or to only a very limited extent, to
informal credit. This is consistent with the
findings of Polly Hill28 who, in a comparative
study of dry grain farming families in Nigeria
and India, found that “the inability to borrow
cash (as such), except in diminutive sums, is
one of  the  ha l lmarks  of  severe
impoverishment.”
The evidence of widespread availability of
and access to informal credit in the study
villages sits in strong contrast to other
comparative views and reports on Afghanistan.
Most notable among these is the Tufts study29
undertaken in 2002-2003 in the immediate
aftermath of the drought, which concluded
somewhat contradictorily that:
• Informal systems of credit are
extremely stressed in Badghis, Herat,
Kabul, Kandahar and Nangarhar
provinces, and few rural people
report being able to lend food or
money to family or community
members; and that
• More than 50 percent of rural
Afghans in Badghis, Herat, Kabul,
Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces
have taken loans and increased their
debt loads during 2002-03.30
It is unclear to what extent these conclusions
reflect the timing of the study, the immediate
aftermath of the long drought that
Afghanistan experienced between 1998-2002,
and the method used,  a formal questionnaire
(the kind that Hill cautions about, as
mentioned earlier). De Weijer31 also argues
that the Kuchi, who were not covered in this
study, are likewise severely constrained in
accessing informal credit:
In the current situation, many Kuchi
have exhausted their opportunities for
obtaining credit, in particular for non-
productive loans, due to past borrowing
which has led to high levels of debt.
This view should be contrasted with the
findings from the NRVA32 on the relatively
greater wealth of the still mobile Kuchi in
contrast to the average settled rural
households. Moreover, and as was found in
the Ghor study reported here, high levels of
debt do not necessarily lead to households
losing access to credit.
The widespread belief in the strong unmet
demand for credit is in part drawn from
conclusions about the role of opium in
providing credit to rural households. Thus,
Goeldner33  refers to the overall demand for
credit and to  the 2002 MISFA assessments
that “estimated the demand for microcredit
at one million households, and that figure
did not include demand for credit above a
micro level.”34
27 Rasmussen, S., 2004. “The current situation of rural finance in Afghanistan,” a paper for a workshop on “Rural Finance in
Afghanistan: The challenge of the opium economy; 1-5.
28 Hill, P., 1984. Dry Grain Farming Families: Hausaland (Nigeria) and Karnataka (India) Compared; 217. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
29 Tufts University, 2004. Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans 2002–2003. Medford, Massachusetts: Tufts Univeristy
Feinstein International Famine Centre.
30 Tufts University, 2004; 176.
31 de Weijer, F., 2005. Microfinance and Kuchis: Background information and recommendations for MFIs.
32 Pinney, A. and S. Ronchini, 2007. “Food Security in Afghanistan after 2001: From assessment to analysis and interpretation
to response,” in Pain and Sutton (eds), Reconstructing Agriculture in Afghanistan; 69-73. ITDG Press.
33  Goeldner, 2004. “Roles and Opportunities for Rural Credit Initiatives in Afghanistan’s Opium Economy,” a paper for a
workshop on “Rural Finance in Afghanistan: The challenge of the Opium Economy.”
34 Goeldner, 2004;3.
41
Finding the Money: Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan
Quite how one accurately estimates demand
and unmet demand is a matter for debate
and nor can the use of opium in providing
informal credit necessarily be seen in the
quite same light as credit demand in formal
credit systems (see the discussion below on
drawing conclusions about formal credit from
informal credit). However, the locations of
this study were not in opium poppy growing
areas and it should be pointed out that non-
opium poppy growing villages must cover the
majority of Afghanistan’s villages—opium
poppy cultivation only covers about five
percent of Afghanistan’s arable area.35 It
should be noted that the levels of debt found
in the village studies are comparable (see
Table 2) to the UNODC reported average
levels of opium poppy derived debt of US$700
for the 45 percent of farmers who took out
such a loan.36
One key issue challenged by the findings from
the villages studied is the way that informal
credit is viewed through the analytical lens
of formal credit and the normative
assumptions that such a perspective contains.
This section proceeds to consider this in more
detail by examining the application of
assumptions derived from formal credit
systems to informal credit practices.
5.2 Defining formal and
informal credit
How is informal credit defined? For
Rasmussen, “80-90 percent of the economic
activity in Afghanistan is in the informal
sector and almost all credit and other financial
transactions are carried out in the informal
sector.” The World Bank,37 on the other
hand, talks in terms of the banking system
that has collapsed, “leaving the entire country
to rely on informal financial systems.”38 The
informal economy usually refers to economic
activity that is not registered for the purposes
of taxation and/or regulation by the state.
But it can also mean particular activities
carried out within the formal sector that
escape state regulation.39 The key issue in
the definition is the degree to which the
activity is registered or regulated—not that
the informal activity is seen in any way to
be far removed from the formal sector. By
the same token, informal credit is defined
in terms of what it is not—it is not formal—
but otherwise its function cannot be separated
from that of formal credit.
This is reinforced by the language and practice
of neo-classical economics (Ellis40) where
credit, formal or informal, is treated like any
other commodity and there is a market that
“behaves”41 according to demand, supply
and a price (interest rate) that acts to balance
supply and demand. The key terminology of
the credit market is expressed in terms of a
lender (individual or institution), a borrower
(a person or enterprise), credit as a sum of
money that is lent, and the provision of
collateral as a device for selecting
creditworthy borrowers. The differences
between informal and formal credit are simply
a matter of the extent to which the different
systems are bound by the legal regulations.
Thus:
Credit may be informal or formal,
private or state in origin. Informal credit
channels refer to the financial services
provided by moneylenders (rich farmers,
traders and others in the rural economy
who lend money on the basis of personal
knowledge of each transaction). Formal
credit channels are those bound by the
legal regulations of a country, and they
include private banks, state banks,
35 UNODC and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, 2006. Afghanistan Opium Survey. Kabul: UNODC.
36 UNODC, 2003 Opium Survey.
37 World Bank, 2006. Afghanistan: World Bank Support for Microfinance (see Reference section for complete url address).
38 Indeed it is possible that the emphasis on the hawala and opium-related credit has focused understanding of the informal
on the illicit trade and has led to overlooking the dimensions of informal credit reported here.
39 Harriss-White, 2003. India Working: Essays on Society and Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
40 Ellis, 1992. Agricultural Policies in Developing Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
41 “Behave” as if markets are some autonomous body and a term that simply reinforces a mechanistic view of the market.
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registered cooperatives and a host of
others. The entire system of institutions
and the way they work is called the rural
financial system.42
In sum informal credit practices are
interpreted and judged entirely through the
lens of the construction, language and
meanings of formal credit. This is problematic
because the dimensions of access, use,
motivations for giving and taking credit and
contractual arrangements described in this
report show that informal credit does not fit
neatly within the confines of formal credit.
The way in which informal credit in
Afghanistan has been interpreted through
the lens of microcredit is revealing. There
are certain attributes of informal credit
practices that have been praised and sought
to be replicated in microcredit programmes.
Goelder43 “refers to the strong respect for
contracts laid out in Islam” that are
contributing to high repayment rates under
microfinance. The World Bank44 comments
on a “strong repayment culture” and
“traditional social capital that is in support
of respect for contracts” and Rasmussen45
argues that microcredit must “try to employ
the advantages of the informal credit system.”
As made clear in Section 4, repayment is far
from being contract-bound and is subject to
continuing negotiation and systematic default.
Hill notes “that partial default and/or late
repayment are so common as to be “usual,”
which is an aspect of the continuing personal
relationship that so often obtains between
creditor and debtor,”46 not least because
there is always the potential that the roles
will be reversed. And as Gregory47 observes,
with respect to money lending in India, it is
the loans taken for non-productive purposes
(marriage and funeral expenses and
consumption) obtained through informal
credit that are systematically repaid, while
the formal loans for productive purposes
issued through banks are not.
Thus, cultural practices have to be seen in
context and the reasons behind them
understood; particular dimensions of them
cannot be simply abstracted and universalised
for other purposes without a great risk of
unintended consequences. Section 6 will
explore whether the high repayment rates
under microcredit alluded to by Goelder
reflect respect for contracts, or more a
perception of the riskiness of this sort of loan
and are thus more applied in formal
microcredit.
If the positive dimensions of informal credit
are to be seen in terms of a repayment
culture, then the negative dimensions are
described in terms of limited access,48 or
that most credit is provided at “usury rates.”49
The extent to which these perceptions are
consistent with the evidence from this study
will be considered below. First, however,
there is a need to consider the purposes for
which formal and informal credits are used
and what they imply for the transfer of
assumptions between the two credit forms.
5.3 The purpose of credit
The World Bank is clear in its view of the
role of microcredit50 — its function is to
enable “poor people to move away from
42 Ellis, 1992:153-154.
43 Goelder, 2004:4.
44 World Bank, 2005.
45 Rasmussen, 2004.
46 Hill, 1986. Development Economic on Trade: Anthropological Case for a Prosecution. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
47 Gregory, C.A., 1997. Savage Money: The Anthropology and Politics of Commodity Exchange, p.69. Amsterdam: Harwood
Academic Publishers
48 Rasmussen, 2004.
49 Goelder, 2004:4.
50 World Bank, 2006.
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being dependent on humanitarian assistance
to becoming economically independent by
building on their innate entrepreneurial spirit
and skills” and to encourage them to engage
in productive activities. Leaving aside the
assertion that the poor are dependent on
humanitarian assistance, microcredit is
characterised here as a means to improve
incomes, savings and raise productivity and
to promote growth in the rural economy;
these combine output and to some extent
equity objectives if the distribution of these
benefits is considered.
This contrasts very strongly with what most
informal credit is used for as the evidence
in Section 4 shows: most credit is used either
for consumption purposes or for life cycle
events such as marriage and funerals. This
is consistent with the evidence provided by
Gregory and ICRISAT.51
Credit and debt practices in the study
locations, given the significance of their use
for consumption and life cycle purposes,
cannot therefore be readily transferred to
likely behaviour in relation to the use of
credit for productive purposes. The same can
be concluded with respect to the broader
question of interest rates, contract periods
and default in the context of informal credit
systems, where again concepts from a neo-
classical economic understanding of formal
credit systems are applied without
consideration of the complexity and meaning
of practices on the ground.
5.4 Informal credit and
timelessness
As seen in Section 4 (for example with “buying
on credit” from shopkeepers), trying to
establish actual interest rates and repayment
periods is almost impossible to do. It is not
that they could emerge if appropriate
research tools were used but more that
interest and contract, as defined in neo-
classical economics, are inappropriate
concepts for the relationships that informal
credit represent in rural Afghanistan.  These
relations are not easily bound within a cost
and time framework because often the money
involved cannot easily be separated from the
other benefits obtained. Hill articulates this
point clearly:
[It is] very often inappropriate for
outsiders to think in terms of interest
rates, both because borrowing is apt to
be timeless (interest rates are never
computed) and again, because of the
attitude to default. From the creditor’s
angle, the important question is not how
long the debt has been outstanding but
the prospects of repayment; as for the
debtor, his usual concern is to repay as
slowly as possible without incurring his
creditor’s final displeasure, and maybe
to borrow more when his debt has
diminished sufficiently.
As Gregory argues: raising the question of
interest rates being high in rural areas
“presupposes that rural money lending
involves quantifiable rates and that these
are high relative to urban rates”52 and, it
might be added, in relation to formal or bank
credit. If one looks at the diversity of informal
credit forms identified in Section 4 it can be
seen, developing from Gregory, that they
can be grouped as follows:
• Cost-free: those for which no meaning
of interest can be attached in any way
—the qarz-i-hasana, which is most widely
used for consumption smoothing in the
Kapisa and Herat villages;
• With interest: those which make an
explicit (in practice it is coded and
secretive although it is well understood
51 See Morduch, “Consumption Smoothing,” Discussion Paper, 2002: 55.
52 Gregory, 1997:213.
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what it amounts to) reference to interest
as with business loans with interest;
• With flexible uncertain costs: those that
contain an implicit reference to
interest/profit although the value and
time associated with this are very flexible
and uncertain. Many of the forms of
delayed payment on goods fall within
this group;
• With collateral where use of land or
labour are the costs: those for which, as
Gregory states, “the notion of an interest
rate is unmeaning. For this kind of money
lending... it makes no sense to talk about
a high rate of interest because the notion
of rate of interest is just not there to be
found.” Within this category, borrowing
against land (found across the three
village locations) or labour (as in the
Ghor village) is probably the most
important form of informal credit—at
least in terms of equivalent cash values
raised. This form of credit Gregory terms
“usance” (use in exchange) to distinguish
it from usury and interest.
With respect to the first category, which is
interest free, exchanges of cash or
commodities, their importance and
prevalence as a credit form should be
emphasised. The second and third categories
all contain some dimension of cost, but except
perhaps for the second category where it
might be possible to determine an interest
rate, interest rate costs are not easily
calculated, if at all. But it is with respect to
this fourth category of informal credit, which
involves an exchange of either money for
land, or labour for food, that the notion of
interest particularly breaks down. Time here
is a notional but flexible part of the exchange
and the transaction is more a form of rental
and the giving away of use rights, rather than
the payment of interest for the duration of
the contract. Gregory elaborates on this
point:
From the perspective of the lender, the
contract can be analysed as a tenancy
agreement. He gets land for which he
pays all his rent in advance. The money
borrower is therefore acting as landlord
and the money lender as a tenant... the
borrower receives rent in advance; he
does not pay interest. The cost to the
borrower is the loss of the use of a
productive asset for the duration of the
contract.53
Naturally, the money borrower has to pay
back the rent that was advanced against the
use of the land and the longer this is delayed,
the cheaper the annual rent (a fixed amount
of money for use of land over a longer period)
that the lender has had to pay. But this is
not a system in which interest accrues,
although the price of land that is foreclosed
may well reflect a hidden charge. But as
noted, foreclosure in the study villages was
rare. In the case of borrowers who have no
property but rely on their labour, as found
in the Ghor village, the position is as follows:
They are forced to mortgage their labour
in exchange for money. From the
perspective of the lender... the contract
can be analysed as a wage-labour
contract with the difference that all
wages are paid in advance. Thus the
borrower receives wages in advance, as
it were, he does not pay interest. The
cost to the borrower is the surrender of
his freedom to the landlord for the
duration of the contract.54
While lending against labour as the security
can be and usually is an exploitative
relationship, it is essentially a social relation
and absolutely different from formal credit
or bank money lending. In the latter, which
is governed by principles of interest-bearing
capital, unpaid debt grows according to
compound interest scheduled against fixed
53 Gregory, 1997:220.
54 Gregory, 1997:221.
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contract periods. Failure to repay under
formal credit leads to loss of assets or land
as has been found in many cases in India.55
What is striking about the case studies
reported in Section 4 is first, how rare the
foreclosure on mortgaged land is and second,
how strongly it is disapproved of when it
happens.  What is also clear is how negotiable
repayment periods are, without necessarily
incurring any form of increased interest
(although this does happen with shopkeeper
credit). For the term interest rate to have
meaning, an exact time period has to be
specified. Time is not a variable applicable
to many of the village-level credit
transactions.
All of this is to point out that terms such as
“interest rate” and “contract period” that
derive from neo-classical economic
perspectives on formal credit are not directly
translatable to the practices that govern
informal credit. Lender and borrower
practices and behaviour have to be seen
within the social context of informal credit
and not universalised to market relations.
None of the comments are made to
romanticise informal credit or to argue that
it is more equitable and fair than formal
credit systems. Clearly there is much about
it that is extractive and unequal, even though
it remains legitimate56 within its context.
But to assume that market-based practices
can be inserted into the social context of
informal credit and selectively capitalise on
the same patterns of behaviour is
presumptuous and likely to lead to failure
or, at minimum, unintended consequences
due to over-simplification.
5.5 The moral economy?
The point made earlier about loans for
consumption and marriage (non-productive
purposes) being usually repaid needs
emphasising since it points to some more
general characteristics of informal credit in
the study villages. Although there are clear
inequalities in land and asset ownership in
the villages, there do not appear to be rigid
class differences between borrower and
lender. This statement needs to be qualified
with respect to Ghor and historically for
Kapisa, but as the Kapisa example shows,
such class differences have not been
entrenched. In this sense there is no clearly
identifiable class of “moneylenders” in the
way that they are found in India, for example.
Three dimensions of Afghanistan’s rural
economy have contributed to this outcome
in the study locations. The first, as borne out
in the evidence from the case studies, is that
the economy of Afghanistan has been fairly
precarious, particularly in its more
mountainous reaches, and even successful
farming families can face dramatic changes
in business or employment conditions. This
can be reinforced, secondly, by the underlying
randomness of family demography where
shifting dependency ratios, marriage
expenses, inheritance, health, family labour
availability can all rapidly have negative and
adverse consequences for a household
economy. Third, land division across
generations inexorably leads to a decline in
farm area per household. This shared
precariousness of life, and the value of
sustaining relationships for reasons of self-
interest, underpins many of the informal
credit transactions.
Reference has been made above to the
legitimacy of informal credit practices and
there is clearly a moral code or set of moral
assumptions that underlies them. Part of this
is a context in which there are a set of
expectations and choices about the relations
between the relatively well-off and the poor.
55 Harris-White, B. and D. Colatei, 2004. “Ruler Credit and the Collateral Question,” in B. Harris-White and S. Janakarajan
(eds). Rural India Facing the 21st Century. Essays in Long-term Change and Recent Development Policy, 252-283. London:
Anthem Press.
56 This is a practice regarded as acceptable even if it is unequal.
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Much of the language used in the reported
case studies, such as assistance, consideration
and helpfulness, often fall under the effective
umbrella of patronage. These dimensions
applied to the provision of employment and
help all operate within a web of respect,
loyalty and social recognition in which the
politics of reputation can be fundamental.
Indeed the evidence of creditors not pressing
for repayment, as found in all three villages
is part of this framework and De Weijer had
similar observations with respect to the Kuchi:
In Nangarhar and Laghman there was no
evidence that they were put under strong
pressure to repay their debts;most of
the loans were taken from relatives who
understand that they need to rebuild
their assets before they can repay all
their debt.57
This moral economy has several dimensions.
Part of it is the way in which custom and
social pressure work to regulate individual
behaviour to conform to traditional norms,
and this of course can be employed as much
by the poor as the rich, for reasons of mutual
interest. Traditional Muslim practice, as the
mullah in Kapisa reminded the mosque, is
about religious values imposing limits on
individualistic economic behaviour. But there
is also a strand of the moral economy that
can be used to regulate behaviour of
avaricious merchants or traders, and can be
used as a means of protest against authority.58
And there is of course more than a degree
of self interest in lending, particularly with
respect to the horizontal relations: today’s
lender may become tomorrow’s borrower
which may well induce a leniency in pressing
for repayment.
But one can also read against the grain with
respect to the moral economy and much of
the evidence related to “vertical relations”
for credit exchange. As exemplified by the
Ghor case study, this can be interpreted as
the attempt of households to seek and achieve
security and protection through informal
means in the context of acute insecurity and
risk.
5.6 Informal security regimes:
“The Faustian Bargain”59
As discussed earlier, the major use of informal
credit found in the village studies was for
consumption smoothing and for household
reproduction (marriage) to provide assistance
into old age—all actions designed to achieve
household survival. The objective of meeting
consumption needs is entirely understandable
but the significance and importance placed
on investment in marriage by households,
draws attention to the emphasis given to
reproduction and family and household level
inter-generational transfers—the logic of
peasant behaviour under conditions of acute
insecurity and risk.60
This risk is not just a matter of random
external shocks (unemployment, harvest
failure, etc.) or challenges that are household-
specific. But as Wood argues,61 the
environment of risk should be seen as
relational and institutional, induced by the
action of individuals or unaccountable
institutions, both informal and formal. These
“structural aspects of risk induced by
inequality, class relations, exploitation and
unaccountable power and social exclusion”
are widespread in Afghanistan. Exposure to
these risks should not just be seen as shocks
(which implies some degree of randomness
about them) but they should be understood
more as hazards that the poor constantly
have to negotiate.
57 de Weijer, 2005:21.
58 Scott, 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence and Rebellion in Southeast Asia. Yale University Press.
59 Wood, 2003. “Staying Secure, Staying Poor: ‘The Faustian Bargain’,” World Development, 31(3): 455-71.
60 Ibid.
61 Wood, 2004. “Informal Security Regimes: The strength of relationships,” Chapter 2 in Gough and Wood, 2003. Insecurity
and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America: Social Policy in Development Contexts. Cambridge University Press.
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Afghanistan without doubt can be
characterised as an environment of extreme
risk and insecurity. Under such conditions
the poor seek protection through the
maintenance of and investment in patron-
client relations, which reinforce positions of
dependency, as illustrated in the Ghor
examples of contract labour. This protection
system however reduces their long-term
choices—The Faustian Bargain—where future
prospects are traded against survival and
security in the present. In economic terms
the poor are risk averse: they sharply discount
the future for the immediate present and
emphasise loyalty over voice in the absence
of exit options. These are elements of the
context that undoubtedly contribute to the
investment in social relations and the
maintenance of informal credit practices,
although how this plays out may be variable
according to context and socio-economic
status.
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6.  Conclusions and Implications
“...formal order... is always and to some considerable degree parasitic on informal
processes, which the formal scheme does not recognise, without which it could not
exist, and which it alone cannot create or maintain.”62
What has emerged from the evidence and
discussion on informal credit is a picture that
lacks clarity, where dimensions such as
interest rate and contractual period are
blurred and where distinctions between
borrower and lender shift and depend on
time and place. This is not a system that can
be disciplined into clear unambiguous order,
dependent as it is on personal and social
relationships and characterised by diversity.
Thus, simple statements on what informal
credit is or is not and what can be done to
address some of its more coercive and
exploitative practices presupposes not only
a capacity to legislate and act and provide
security through formal state-provided social
protection or market-based mechanisms
(which in the current context is unrealistic)
but also an assumption that formal credit is
an alternative and replacement to informal
credit. What do these insights into informal
credit practices mean to the specific model
of microcredit that is so strongly promoted
in Afghanistan? The binary or contrast of
formal with informal credit presupposes an
“either-or” choice. Formal credit systems
with their clearly defined parameters—
borrower, lender, collateral, contract and
repayment period—can replace the muddle
and mess of the informal. There are a number
of reasons to be confident that this will not
happen.
First, the functions that informal credit serve,
if one looks at just the direct utility of it and
ignores the broader social role that it fulfils,
are specifically concerned with reproduction—
either through meeting consumption needs
and immediate survival or longer term inter-
generational transfers through marriage.
Informal credit practices appear to be hardly
directed toward “productive” use which is
seen to be the primary role of formal
microcredit. It might be argued that
microcredit, where it uses group lending
practices and links lending to group savings
schemes, will provide at least the means to
address consumption smoothing, if not of
marriage.
However, it will depend on the extent to
which the poor effectively become members
of these savings groups and are able to save,
and the extent to which group formation
processes reflect and build on the informal
networks that already exist. It remains to be
seen whether or not the formal and relatively
inflexible rule-driven nature of group lending
actually provides the flexibility and
responsiveness to demand and allowance of
multiple levels of debt that informal credit
systems appear to provide.
Second, comparative evidence points to the
persistence of informal credit systems in
general, alongside established formal credit
systems. Gregory, for example, notes how
“village money lending is still the most popular
form” of lending even where there is bank
lending available.63 Harriss-White & Colatei
concludes that despite a long history of formal
bank credit targeted toward the poor, in the
study villages in Tamil Nadu,  “70 percent of
households borrow from informal sources”
and a majority of these borrow only from
informal sources.64
62 Scott, 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.Yale, Yale University
Press: 310.
63 Gregory, 1997:223.
64 Harris-White, Colatei, 2004:260.
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In part, this points to some of the advantages
that informal credit offers over formal credit—
its flexibility, its ready access and negotiable
contract periods and the lower risk of losing
collateral such as land, which is a real risk65
with formal credit. Indeed the requirement
for collateral in formal bank credit systems,
which is usually land, has effectively acted
as a rationing mechanism to exclude the poor
and particularly the landless from accessing
such credit. As Harris-White and Colatei found
in Tamil Nadu: “The access of all kinds of
socially disadvantaged households to formal
credit is extremely constrained.” In contrast,
there is a wide diversity of credit types in
informal credit accessible to the poor and
these are often cost free and renegotiable.
Microcredit, where it uses group lending and
savings practices, is argued to sidestep the
problems of targeted credit for the poor and
to promote sustainable financial systems for
the poor. The Grameen Bank is widely
acclaimed as a model for microcredit lending
that is pro poor and promotes savings, security
and income growth possibilities. But it should
be pointed out that there is evidence66
questioning the claims of success attributed
to the Grameen Bank model and this leads
to the third point.
The evidence from the study of microcredit
practice under the Grameen Bank points very
clearly to the fact that the formal microcredit
system was not simply running in parallel
with the informal credit system but that they
were closely intertwined, and not necessarily
in a positive way. The contractual basis on
which group lending based microcredit works
is to shift all the risk of default on payment
from the lender (the bank) to the group and
to impose a strict timetable with respect to
repayment. Rahman’s study points to
numerous cases where group repayment
pressures had demanded that the individual
had to take loans from informal sources in
order to meet the repayment, effectively
putting them more into debt rather than less.
This mirrors examples cited by Gregory of
recourse to informal credit to manage formal
credit debts.
Arising from this is the fourth point: it is
likely that the very poor who do not even
have access to informal credit, but at least
keep access to assistance, are even less likely
to have access to group-based microcredit
systems with their emphasis on investment
for productive purposes and the building of
savings.
65 Gregory, 1997.
66 Rahman,  2001. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh: An Anthropological Study of Grameen Bank Lending.
Philadelphia, PA:Perseus.
Box 2. The “success” of group-based microcredit (as of September 2006)
• Total outreach has crossed 250,000 clients.
• Three-fourths of the clients were women.
• 35 percent of the clients lived in the rural areas.
• Services had reached 22 of the country’s 34 provinces.
• US$120 million has been disbursed in half a million loans.
• 98 percent of loans were repaid on time.
• Microfinance institutions had mobilized US$6 million in savings by poor people.
• Loans were used for service businesses and trade (58 percent), crops and livestock (22
percent), and handicrafts and manufacturing (20 percent).
• Average loan size was US$200.
• The number of microfinance service providers had risen to 14, from three in 2003.
• The sector was able to cover 80 percent of its operating costs.
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Finally, following on the points raised above,
attention needs to be paid to how microcredit
is formally monitored and what is being
reported. A good example is what has been
reported (see Box 2) by the World Bank67
with respect to the “success” of the ongoing
microfinance programme in Afghanistan.
While attention should be drawn to the urban
bias of the programme—and this contrasts
with the rural basis of the studies reported
here— particular note should be paid to
broader indicators on which the programme
is claiming success: number of service
providers, financial disbursements, use of
loans, loan size, financial sustainability and
the repayment of loans. This is the public
transcript of success68 and the language and
understanding of formal credit but it tells us
nothing of the way in which loans are actually
used and negotiated within a context of
internal and external household and
community dynamics and power, and whose
interests they serve in practice. This is what
Scott would call the “hidden transcript”—
precisely the dimensions reported by
Rahman69 and which may qualify the way
success is seen and claimed.
Policy recommendations do not naturally flow
from this study of informal credit and there
is much that remains unclear about its nature
and practices. But there are some important
lessons to be derived from this study that
have relevance to microcredit. They can be
summarised as follows:
• Informal credit systems appear alive
and well and, contrary to some of
the assertions referenced earlier,
most households do have access to
one or more of their diverse forms.
The way in which they function,
based on social rather than market
relations, strongly questions the use
of a formal credit approach to
understand the principles and
practices of informal credit.  This
approach critically misreads the
nature of informal credit. In
addition, the formal approach does
not leave much room for distinction
in equating “informal” with “illicit”
in describing the roles of opium
poppy in village-level credit and the
hawala in transfers of opium-derived
income.
• The role that informal credit systems
fulfill is very different from that of
microcredit. In their use for
consumption smoothing and
marriage, the practices are driven
by a household need for survival
underpinned by a combination of a
moral economy, which cannot be
assumed to apply to microcredit
systems, and the need to achieve
security in an insecure context.
Microcredit is highly unlikely to fulfill
this broad range of functions and
potentially might undermine or
subvert the significance, principles
and role of these informal systems.
• Both informal credit systems and
formal microcredit will exclude the
effectively destitute. The village
moral economy clearly provides
assistance to such people;
microcredit does not address this
group, nor does it aim to.
• Informal credit systems are highly
unlikely to be supplanted by formal
micro-credit practices. But
comparative evidence indicates that
formal microcredit can become
parasitic on informal credit systems
67 World Bank, 2006.
68 Scott, 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. Yale University Press.
69 See also Pain, 2001, for evidence on the contrast between the public text of success for a group lending scheme for women
carpet weavers and the private reality of probable adverse consequences (”Livelihoods under stress in Faryab Province,
Northern Afghanistan,” a report for Save the Children (USA), Pakistan Office.
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in that informal credit can be used
to pay back formal loans.
• This raises questions about what is
promoted as success with respect
to microfinance. The reported high
repayment rate for microcredit loans
is surprising particularly in the light
of the high “default” rate on
informal credit. This is certainly not
due to “a strong repayment culture”
as some would claim. Might it be
more due to pressures imposed under
group lending practices? This needs
to be examined more closely.
• There is also a need to gain better
understanding of the linkages
between opium poppy sourced
informal credit and other informal
credit systems. Has the availability
of such credit significantly altered
informal credit systems and
practices? What effects occur when
opium poppy becomes newly
established in an area, compared to
when it is in decline?
In response to the questions raised by many
of these points, AREU is in the process of
conducting two additional studies on credit
systems in Afghanistan. One addresses the
final point and will explore the linkages
between opium poppy sourced informal credit
and other existing sources of informal credit
in one village in a region with declining
cultivation, and in one village in a region
with increasing cultivation. The aim is to
understand how these cultivation-related
dynamics affect access to and the prevalence
and practices of informal credit. The second
study focuses on formal credit systems and
aims to assess their effects on rural livelihoods
and informal credit systems.  Results of both
studies are forthcoming in 2007-08. 
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CS1-H 6 2 100 3 X X W
CS2-H 10 4 20 2 X X W
CS3-H 11 2 20 6 X X W
CS4-H 9 4 10 2 X X X X W
CS5-H 20 5 8 7 X X X W
CS6-H 15 2 60 7 X X X W
CS7-H 11 4 36 6 X X X W
CS8-H 13 8 10 2 X X W
CS9-H 7 4 70 4 X X W
CS10-H 6 2 1 1 X X W
CS11-H 7 2 20 X X X W
CS12-H 8 1 10 X W
CS13-H 9 3 8 27 X X X W
CS14-H 5 3 X X MR
CS15-H 7 2 1.5 X X X MR
CS16-H 18 4 X X X X MR
CS17-H 4 2 X MR
CS18-H 8 3 1.5 X X X MR
CS19-H 10 5 X X MR
CS20-H 8 3 1 X X X MR
CS21-H 9 2 0.5 X MR
CS22-H 7 1 0.5 X X X X MR
CS23-H 9 6 X P
CS24-H 5 1 X P
CS25-H 8 2 1 X X P
CS26-H 11 5 X P
CS27-H 2 1 P
CS28-H 1 X P
CS29-H 10 2 X P
CS30-H 4 3 X X P
CS31-H 8 1 1 1 X P
CS32-H 7 2 2 X X X P
7. Annex
Appendix 1.  Respondent Asset Portfolios
Appendix Table 1. Asset portfolios of the respondents in the Herat Village
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CS33-K 10 3 0.4 1 X X x W
CS34-K 7 1 0.3 2 X X W
CS35-K 12 5 2 X X W
CS36-K 4 2 1 3 X X W
CS37-K 5 1 2.5 X X MR
CS38-K 4 2 1.5 X X MR
CS39-K 9 2 0.4 X X MR
CS40-K 12 2 3 X X MR
CS41-K 19 3 6 2 X X MR
CS42-K 6 2 X MR
CS43-K 11 2 0.2 4 X X MR
CS44-K 6 1 X MR
CS45-K 9 3 0.3 2 X X X MR
CS46-K 5 2 0.3 1 X X X MR
CS47-K 11 2 X MR
CS48-K 7 1 0.5 2 X X MR
CS49-K 11 2 1 X MR
CS50-K 8 1 0.2 X X MR
CS51-K 7 1 1 3 X X MR
CS52-K 6 3 0.8 X X MR
CS53-K 11 4 0.8 1 X X MR
CS54-K 9 2 0.2 2 X X X MR
CS55-K 11 3 1.2 1 X X MR
CS56-K 6 1 0.2 1 X X MR
CS57-K 6 1 0.2 X X MR
CS58-K 6 2 X X P
CS59-K 4 2 0.5 X X P
CS60-K 5 1 0.3 X P
CS61-K 3 2 0.2 1 X X P
CS62-K 6 2 0.5 1 X P
Appendix Table 2. Asset portfolios of the respondents in the Kapisa village
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CS63-G 11 2 25 R 19 X X X W
CS64-G 8 2 10 R 6 X X W
  O,21
CS65-G 2 1 25 R 54 X W
CS66-G 8 6 1,4 R 5 X X X MR
CS67-G 2 1 2 X MR
CS68-K 7 1 0,7 R 1 X X MR
CS69-G 8 4 2 R 7 X X MR
CS70-G 14 2 2,8 R 7 X X MR
CS72-G 5 2 2,8 R 4 X X MR
CS73-G 6 2 1,4 R X X MR
CS74-G 5 1 1,4 R X X MR
CS75-G 7 3 2 R 3 X X MR
CS76-G 5 1 1,4 R 6 X X MR
0,7 I
CS77-G 4 2 0,9 1 X X MR
CS78-G 9 2 2,8 13 X X X MR
CS79-G 10 5 0,9 R 7 X X X MR
CS80-G 10 5 0,9 R 8 X X X X MR
CS81-G 3 2 2 R 5 X X MR
CS82-G 7 2 1,7 R X X X MR
CS83-G 5 1 X X MR
CS84-G 9 4 2 X X X MR
CS85-G 5 3 4,3 R X X X MR
CS86-G 10 1 3,5 R 10 X MR
CS87-G 8 1 X X MR
CS88-G 3 3 X X P
CS89-G 7 2 X P
CS80-G 9 1 X P
CS81-G 9 3 1 X P
CS82-G 11 2 1 X X P
CS83-G 6 1 X X P
CS84-G 5 1 X P
CS71-G 11 3 3,5 R 6 X X MR
Appendix Table 3. Asset portfolios of the respondents in the Ghor village
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Delayed payment of goods and labour
The general practice is that when a good is
bought on credit, the shopkeeper records
this, where upon depending on how long the
debt is outstanding, the borrowed good will
have a marked-up price. There is, however,
no fixed rate for the amount of marked-up
price given and is highly dependent on the
shopkeeper. However, in general, it depends
on the length of time of the outstanding
debt, the relation the client has with the
shopkeeper, and if the shopkeeper wants to
assist the households taking credit. Goods
bought on credit are only recorded by the
shopkeeper even if a client can read and
write. Repayment is done either within a few
months, per season, or in longer stretches
of longer than one year. There were several
cases of delayed payment of wages in Ghor
and Kapisa, this was mainly with builders. It
is unclear if this was agreed when they were
hired and if their salary is higher to
compensate for the delay as is the case with
buying on credit with shopkeepers, though
it is unlikely to be the case.
Advances on wage
Advances taken on future work was only
found in Ghor among the contract labourers
belonging to the poor wealth group. Wheat,
and sometimes money, are provided by a
wealthy villager as an advance on work to
be provided for a certain period in the
future.70 The creditor is often a big landowner
whom the debtor already has a relation with
as contract labourer and which provides the
creditor with a source of cheap labour.71
Reciprocal cost-free, in-kind and cash loans
Most households both give and take cash and
in-kind loans between close relatives and
neighbours. It is a reciprocal exchange in
that one gives credit to the household one
expects to take credit from in the future,
and is repaid within a time span ranging from
one week to two to three months, in the
exact amount as was borrowed. As what is
repaid is the same as what is given, there
are no costs involved, this credit type is
considered qarz-i-hasana (cost-free loans).
Larger cash loans were predominantly
provided and taken by wealthy and middle-
ranking households and used for weddings,
(re)building houses, buying small plots of
land for houses (Herat), going on haj (Ghor),
or major health costs (the highest amount
reported was 80,000 Afs (US$ 1,600). A
timeframe is often set with the larger cash
loans, even if reciprocal in nature, though
repayment often remains flexible when the
borrower is not able to return the loan. The
creditor always has the right to request his
money back when the agreed repayment
timeframe has lapsed.
In-kind loans with profit
This takes place when large quantities of
wheat, for example, are borrowed under the
agreement of a specified timeframe of
repayment (e.g. the following harvest). The
agreement is such that it is repaid in cash
with a pre-determined higher value. For
instance, if 20 ser of wheat is borrowed (the
equivalent of 140 kg) in late winter, this
needs to be repaid in cash at harvest for the
70 This credit form is similar to salam found in poppy growing areas where households receive an advance on future crops at
lower prices.
71 As wages of contract labourers in general are around 1/3 of a daily labour rate, it likely wages taken in advance to be
similar or less.
Appendix 2: Credit types found in the three villages studied: Herat,
Kapisa and Ghor
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value of 100 Afs per ser (7 kg), whereas the
market value is 70-80 Afs per ser. This credit
type was only found in the Ghor village. Those
providing this credit were the more wealthy
relatives or villagers. When the debt could
not be repaid at harvest time, the debtor
would work on the creditors land until the
debt is repaid.72
Mortgage
Mortgage is a cash credit provided with land
as collateral where the usage right of the
land passes to the creditor. Thus, a household
mortgaging their land even though still owning
it loses the right to cultivate it. Often a
contract is made for three years between
creditor and debtor. If the debt is not repaid
after this term, either a new timeframe is
agreed upon, or the creditor has the right to
demand his money back and force sale of the
land. However in practice this is rarely found.
The amount of money provided (the
mortgage) is based on the value of the land,
thus mortgages taken during the drought are
often of less value than mortgages taken
after the drought.
Business credit
Business credit was only found to be provided
and taken in the Herat village by the middle-
 ranking and wealthy households. This is most
likely due to the many businesses present in
the village. The only business credit found
was mozarebat.73 This involves an investor
providing capital for a business in exchange
for a percentage of the profit (depending on
the amount invested and relative to the
amount possible others have invested). When
profit is made it will be shared between the
investor(s) and the business owner for as long
as the business lasts, for a pre-agreed upon
time span, or until the money is repaid by
the business owner. If business fails, for
whatever reason, no money needs to be
repaid to the investor. The amount of business
credit found was up to 80,000 Afs (US$ 1600).
Business loan with interest
A loan provided with a pre-determined
interest rate was considered a taboo, often
conducted in secret and not spoken of. The
only village where respondents mentioned it
was practiced was in Herat. A school teacher
reported how it was practiced only for
business and provided by wealthy villagers.
He called it an alternative for mozarebat,
which one would only engage in when
confident the business succeeds. As described
earlier, mozarebat profit has to be shared
between the investor(s)/creditor(s). If a
businessman is confident he will be able to
repay the debt soon, credit with interest is
an option, as the profits made in the business
do not have to be shared afterwards with the
creditor as is the case with mozarebat. Also
the creditor would only provide credit with
interest to a debtor who is likely to repay it.
As this practice is conducted secretly, the
likelihood of the debtor being able to regain
it would involve making things public. The
interest itself was said to be repaid in cash
or in-kind.
72 Historical accounts on the central highlands of Afghanistan by Ferdinand (1959 And 1962) have reported this credit type
often being provided by the Kuchi and taken by the Hazara of Ghor However, he describes how when the debt is not repaid
after harvest, the debt is transferred to the next harvest which entails the debt in cash is transferred back to wheat. But
as the agreed upon repayment was in cash and at a higher price, transferring the debt back from cash to wheat at a market
price the quantity of wheat for the second cycle of the debt has increased. If the debt cannot be repaid in the following
harvest again the debt will be transferred back to wheat at an increased amount. Thus with years of default the debt will
increase to unsustainable levels. This study did not come across households engaging in this continuous cycle of ever-
increasing debt amounts.
73 Called in the Herat village shariq.
57
Finding the Money: Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan

CGAP, 2003. “Helping to Improve Donor Effectiveness in Microfinance: Rural Financial Services for
the Poor.” Donor Brief No. 15; Oct. 2003, www.cqap.org.
Ellis, F., 1992. Agricultural Policies in Developing Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ferdinand, K., 1959. Preliminary notes on Hazara culture: the Danish Scientific Mission to Afghanistan,
1952-55. Kopenhagen: Enjar Munksgaard.
Ferdinand, K.,1962. Nomad expansion and commerce in central Afghanistan: A sketch of some modern
trends.
Goeldner, K., 2004. Roles and opportunities for rural credit initiatives in Afghanistan’s opium
economy. Paper for a workshop on “Rural finance in Afghanistan: The challenge of the opium economy.”
Grace, J. and A. Pain, 2004. Rethinking Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research
and Evaluation Unit (AREU).
Gregory, C.A.,1997. Savage Money: The Anthropology and Politics of Commodity Exchange. Amsterdam:
Harwood Academic Publishers.
Hanifi, S.M., 2004. “Impoverishing a Colonial Frontier: Cash, Credit and Debt in Nineteenth-century
Afghanistan.” Iranian Studies, 37(2):199.
Harriss-White, B., 2003. India Working: Essays on Society and Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Harris-White, B. and D. Colatei, 2004. “Rural Credit and the Collateral Question,” in B. Harris-White
and S. Janakarajan (eds). Rural India Facing the 21st Century, Essays in Long Term Change and Recent
Development Policy, pp 252-283. London: Anthem Press.
Hill, P., 1984. Dry Grain Farming Families: Hausaland (Nigeria) and Karnataka (India) Compared.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, P., 1986. Development Economics on Trial: The Anthropological Case for a Prosecution, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Johnecheck, W.,  2007. “The Evolution of Food Security Information in Afghanistan: A case of limited
‘availability,’ ‘access’ and ‘utilisation,’” in Pain and Sutton (eds). Reconstructing Agriculture in
Afghanistan, pp 69-73. ITDG Press.
Klijn, F., 2006. Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan, Case Study 1: Herat. Kabul: AREU.
Klijn, F., 2006. Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan, Case Study 2: Kapisa. Kabul: AREU.
Klijn, F., 2007. Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan, Case Study 3: Ghor, Kabul: AREU.
Lautze, S., E. Stites, N. Nojumi and F. Najimi, 2002. Qaht-e-Pool: “A Cash Famine”: Food insecurity
in Afghanistan 1999–2002. Medford, MA: Tufts University Feinstein International Famine Centre.
http://famine.tufts.edu/research/natsios.html
Mansfield, D., 2004. “Diversity and Dilemma: Understanding Rural Livelihoods and Addressing the
Causes of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Laghman, Eastern Afghanistan.” A Report for
Alternative Livelihoods (PAL) in Eastern Afghanistan.
8. References
59
Finding the Money: Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan
MISFA website, http://www.misfa.org/about/htm
Mousavi, S. A. 1998. The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political
Study. Surrey, England: Curzon Press.
Murdoch, J., 2002. “Consumption Smoothing Across Space.” Discussion Paper:55; for International
Centre for Research in the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), carried out between 1974 and 1984 in the
dry zones of India. World Institute for Development Economics Research.
Pain, A., 2001. Livelihoods under stress in Faryab Province, Northern Afghanistan. A Report for Save
the Children (USA), Pakistan Office.
Pinney, A. and S.Ronchini, 2007. “Food Security in Afghanistan after 2001: From assessment to analysis
and interpretation to response,” in Pain and Sutton (eds), Reconstructing Agriculture in Afghanistan,
pp 69-73. ITDG Press.
Rahman, A,  2001. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh: An Anthropological Study of Grameen
Bank Lending. Philadelphia, PA: Perseus.
Rasmussen, S., 2004. “The current situation of rural finance in Afghanistan,” a paper for a workshop
on “Rural Finance in Afghanistan: The challenge of the opium economy, pp 1-5.
Scott, J.C., 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence and Rebellion in Southeast Asia.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Scott, J.C., 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, Yale University Press.
Scott, J.C., 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have
Failed, p. 310. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Semple, M., 1998. “Strategies for Support of Sustainable Rural Livelihoods for the Central Highlands
of Afghanistan,” a study to identify opportunities for effective assistance to reinforce people’s
livelihood strategies, DRAFT, Islamabad: Pattan Development Organisation.
Tapper, N., 1991, Bartered brides; politics, gender and marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society,
Cambridge.
Tufts University, 2004. Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans 2002–2003. Massachusetts:
Tufts Univeristy Feinstein International Famine Centre.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2003. Afghanistan Opium Survey. Kabul: UNODC.
UNODC and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN), 2006. Afghanistan Opium Survey. Kabul: UNODC.
de Weijer, F., 2005. Microfinance and Kuchis, background information and recommendations for MFIs.
Wood, G., 2003. “Staying Secure, Staying Poor: The Faustian Bargain.” World Development, 31 (3):
455-71.
Wood, G., 2004. “Informal Security Regimes: The strength of Relationships,” Chapter 2 in Gough and
Wood, 2003. Insecurity and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America: Social Policy in
Development Contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
World Bank, 2005. Workshop summary on “Rural Finance in Afghanistan: The Challenge of the Opium
Economy.
World Bank, 2006. Afghanistan: World Bank Support for Microfinance:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/COUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21166200-
pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html
vi60
AREU Synthesis Paper Series
June 2007 To Return or to Remain: The Dilemma of Second-generation Afghans in
Pakistan, by Mamiko Saito and Pamela Hunte
April 2007 Afghanistan Research Newsletter 13
April 2007 Afghanistan’s Health System Since 2001: Condition Improved, Prognosis
Cautiously Optimistic, by Ron Waldman, Lesley Strong and Abdul Wali
April 2007 Aiding the State? International Assistance and the Statebuilding Paradox
in Afghanistan, by Hamish Nixon
February 2007 Water Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Options for Land
Registration, by Alec McEwen and Sharna Nolan
February 2007 Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan, Case Study 3: Ghor, by
Floortje Klijn
January 2006 Afghanistan Research Newsletter 11-12
December 2006 Water Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Opium Poppy
Cultivation in Nangarhar and Ghor, by David Mansfield
December 2006 Informal Credit Practices in Rural Afghanistan: Case Study 2, Kapisa
November 2006 The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance, Fifth Edition
November 2006 Putting the Cart Before the Horse? Privatisation and Economic Reform in
Afghanistan, by Anna Paterson
October 2006 Water Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Livestock Production
and Health, by Euan Thomson
September 2006 Moving Forward? Assessing Public Administration Reform in Afghanistan,
by Sarah Lister
August 2006 Urban Livelihoods in Afghanistan, by Jo Beall and Stefan Shütte
August 2006 Afghan Transnational Networks: Looking Beyond Repatriation by Alessandro
Monsutti
August 2006 Water Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy: Annotated
Bibliography
August 2006 Opium Poppy Eradication: How to raise risk when there is nothing to lose?
by David Mansfield and Adam Pain
All AREU publications are available for downloaded at:
Hard copies are available at AREU’s office in Kabul.
Recent Publications from AREU
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
Flower Street (Corner of Street 2)
Shahr-i-Naw, Kabul, Afghanistan
phone: +93 (0)79 608 548 email: areu@areu.org.af website: www.areu.org.af


